


## **Ringhals - Operational Experience on Silver** and Antimony related to doses

ISOE International Symposium Brussels 1-3 June 2016 Madelene Johansson, Ringhals NPP


## **Ringhals NPP site overview**

Unit 3 (1981) PWR Westinghouse 3 loop 2nd generation (609+609 MWe)





- All units running 12 months cycle
- No zinc injection
  - All PWRs have performed SGR
- Elevated pH/Li program (7,4)






Unit 4 (1983) PWR Westinghouse 3 loop 2nd generation (609+609 MWe)



Unit 2 (1975) PWR Westinghouse 3 loop 1st generation (455+455 MWe)



#### **Problem statement**




## Co-60 is **NOT** the only concern...

How well do we know the sources and behaviour of other species and the impact on generating radiation <sup>2016-06-01</sup> fields?

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### **Collective Radiation Exposures – Ringhals Unit 3**



#### From CRE best quartile to worst quartile....

2013 ICES Report 310988, Increased Dose Rates due to High Amounts of Silver (Ag-110), Sept. 25

#### 2014

Unit 2 experienced Sb-124 transport and deposit on the RHR system. 60% Sb-124 contribution to dosrates. Radiation fields increased by a factor 2-3. Estimated additional outage dose 250 mmanSv.

#### How do we get from reactive to proactive?

- Should CRE be the only indicator for ALARA performance?
- Industry Source Term Reduction Indicator/Index?



Estimation that 2 grams of silver had been activated in Ringhals 3 in 2013



## Control Rod "Fingers" Ag (80) In(15) Cd (5)

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#### Refuel Outage Unit 3 in 2010

A piece from the O-ring was found with the weight of 0,15 gram. It could not alone had caused the elevated levels of silver in the coolant.


Refuel Outage Unit 3 in 2013 7 of 48 inspectied control rods showed axial cracks on one or more fingers.

More likely the source



## Inspection of control rod finger from Ringhals 3 (Studsvik)







#### Ringhals 2

Styrstav	Antal cykler i härd	Antal cykler i CBD-poition
R008	15	1
R029	15	3

#### Ringhals 3 (2013)

Styrstav	Antal cykler i härd	Antal cykler i CBD-poition
D112		
R113	17	3
R117	16	4
R118	16	5
R119	16	3
R120	16	4
R122	16	1
R123	15	4

#### Ringhals 4 (2014)

Styrstav	Antal cykler i härd	Antal cykler i CBD-poition
R138	19	1

All control rods inspected with cracks are supplied by the same vendor and all from the same generation, -93. Several other control rods have been running under similar conditions but it is only the control rods from this generation inspected with cracks.

The cause is undetermined, but it can not be ruled out manufacturing tolerances or other manufacturing defects.

Reactor safety was not affected by the problem occurred R3. Inspections of the rods in recent years have not shown any reportable swelling that would prevent the control rods falling in the expected manner.


The problem at R4 was that we were running with control rods from the same delivery as the cracked rods from R3.

Experience from inspections of R34 is that cracks are detected before control rod fingers swell.



Even rods with tiny cracks (hairline crack) can cause leakage of the absorber materials into the reactor water. These cracks occurs by radiation-induced stress corrosion cracking (IASCC). This type the damage does not affect the control rod function but must be replaced due to ALARA and radiation safety concerns.

Experience from inspected control rods with cracks indicates that number of cycles in the core should be reduced (17 for R3 and R4, 15 for R2) and that the following limits on the permitted neutron fluence shall apply:  $42 \le \emptyset \le 54$ 




Optimized positioning for control rod time in the core:

- 2 to 3 cycles in CBD-position
- 8 to 9 cycles in inner core region
- 3 to 4 cycles in outer region non CBD pos.



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
#### Accumulated release of Ag-110m during shut down



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## **Shut Down Release Unit 3**



## Different behaviour for Ag-110m observed

Only one criteria for shut down release clean up:

- lifting reactor vessel head 5E5Bq/kg (Co-58)
- No criteria for Ag
- No criteria for Sb

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## Extended RCP run time from 12 hours to 18 hours



## Monitoring program - Survey locations for GSA and doserates

**S**2

C2


Ċ3

CI

**S1** 

#### RCS

EPRI SRMP (Standard Radiation Monitor Program) – Reactor Coolant Loop Piping




#### **CVCS**

- 9 survey points:
  - Let down piping
  - Heat exchangers

#### RHR


1 |

- 6 survey points:
  - RHR piping (4)
  - Heat exchangers (2)



= GSA survey point








#### **Trending data Ringhals 3**


Co-60 Sb-124 Co-58 Ag-110m



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## Silver and Antimony deposition Impact on radiation fields



© Ringhals AB




## Summary of measures and R&D work

- Literature study (completed)
- Expanded radiation field monitoring
  - Installation of permanent installed GSA equipment (TBD)
- An overlay macroporouse resin has been put on ion exchanger in Ringhals 3 after 2015 refuel outage.
- Extended RCP run time during shut down release. Implementation of stopping criteria (TBD)
- Document Technical Basis for Materials (TBM) has been updated with limitations regarding Ag and Sb.
- Ultra Sonic Fuel cleaning implemented at all Ringhals PWR units. Implementation of alternative shut down operations. *(TBD)*
- Loop testing to identify Sb behaviour under various coolant chemistry conditions (Initiated project in collaboration with Studsvik)



## Schematic illustration of the loop test exposure scheme



To be continued...



# Thank you!

