ࡱ> `!LI˃+sȲ,wM}xyxd&4LfLYII6mJ,&pؑ *`i) P"KYRdY,T@ Ȧ};lEPhs9Ͻyso|3ORB1*7KB2e P=IEQ`q޿WE2d Inr#@vUtJlDzdF0練먑z,ŘRCp.zAsh^@Cxo66&[ mGcҽtMdyj,L1K;IVO?eٙ;IN-a{\5ǯ#5dlMLPHz:˅aE;1FΊhl9G`#90șv jDZve1݊5x͉і Wnq@::ce[Wafk ~bŶOx7oɖ#8>a6+ff̬`2YgEb5#z6@>d_" kO2:h}iAng+[%}EfNv+lwkä~tb{~)"ig41X| s\w<N;P5WR)rJe,iGtQU(5&HvuJ@^!VRHg{$%xPǥii:x^ ]AϡsG)&hJ5?4vT,h}=-$ fG9\.pb#a։f-$Vve%:#rY|2!|ef*fF :79c"{,"7 ̱VW[ZuDRo۩+E^جZ(WTb**vPb*UZU;7 P* %To=/?sdzI2 1Wo+{5p-=tq6:Ov7.hFvo!0=}dP4(ޗitG"?_lO,ψ/L ϊި!(D uu`P >|)x7s03/9{ofUZ+ [L@JoM?L_뿑ՄHc8vKtWptzA0v8'X# wsԇ5펥ᛎ)a406n?= γ?Y,($TG{Dh{jDsMѯٿ{۲YaSv BEτdθDc< r. z|%D(̙*" ,J -IXxI,Nt''E1b2cX[:VZ^ Yn[LP#ԗy#T  #Ԋ*d]Bk3l2+7 `װpvp8.#77LfP530lgYXZrw-(E6Lhd'-z-ȶ l^l.xqxO,VΈMfgb;;FRd7ٱzײRfVmYff,̈LYL˔_%{O6[\A[V/M@dYL96/7*sˬ2 ޔ˾Ⱦ-}(+#-3<85wK+`&Y|%XGg^T6_B u7<z<&B!/)sљ:8 1/="K*uLϾjn^&DkRhwHA>6WG̟GG ͳfWdϳ̛eO3^m>]kN,J,nm.̱^9wsN9mrV93q ^ 8Q$z3osx2*#{&Lk_1 a;!g@¯oaocӥ@iW`@il0i R6,KK5ƚ5c}4%s~7EFF25"$Rcex=ߐnGo5EA>c}T}X7db嬋iʪNەu> [ipt,vݥCZ>vrTpjҷ@ %}m ˥IW+w9Ϝ^lC9iStR|Q)9 ; jTp "JI)pR9ߘ?s?M .>P~U^y$(P WANO SER 2001-2 Risk assessments considering prior experience Contingency work plans for high-risk evolutions Thorough pre-job briefs and shift handoversR20(Q Susquehanna Perspective on Root Causes Inaccurate risk perception for exposure to DRP Process focus on actual doses vs. potential doses Inadequate pre-job plans for DRP controls Unresolved cultural issues regarding questioning attitude, communications, use of operating experienceZ'Z/2Z'0(! rWhat Have We Learned Lack of sensitivity to the consequences of highly radioactive material (particles) (Root Cause 2) Attitude that significant radiological events can t happen at SSEST0,(,O* What Have We Learned Particle assessments focused on actual doses versus potential doses (Root Cause 2) Inadequate pre-job plans were developed for the FPCO project for the control of particles (Root Cause 4) ^0($(> What Have We Learned We need to improve control of radioactive material on refueling floor and in potentially impacted systemsT2j(6j$R What Have We Learned The associated vacuuming and filtration of the cask storage pit (CSP) were less than adequate to control the DRP source term. Rinsing of all items that were removed from the CSP and fuel pools was not performed for every evolution. F(6$; What Have We Learned Need to structure pre-job briefings for hot particle control zone (HPCZ) work Need specific RWPs for HPCZ work Need to consider the use of respiratory protection to prevent the intake of particles8($@  What Have We Learned Radiation Protection Technicians needed more training on DRP survey and containment techniques Self-assessment program was not sufficiently risk-oriented `0206(( Corrective Actions Revised RP procedures to enhance radiological controls Survey techniques Labeling and posting Dose rate limits and dress requirements Control of radioactive material 7o6<7(o6S Corrective Actions Treat high risk/high consequence evolutions as special evolutions Add management oversight for high risk activities Focus self-assessment programT6<(vF *Summary Be proactive to potential conditions rather than reactive to emergent conditions When the mindset exists that  it can t happen here, it willT6<(6T sINPO SER 4-98 addressed precursors for unplanned exposures Three of the root causes aligned with the SER precursorsTo6<n(6U >INPO SER 4-98: Common Event Precursors Inaccurate or incomplete radiological surveys Inadequate work planning and radiation work permits Incorrect guidance provided by radiological protection technicians Non-compliance with radiological protection rules Ineffective supervisory and management direction and oversight8''(V Defense in Depth Strong management Comprehensive planning Accurate risk perception Culture of awareness and risk control Good measurement processes*(W  QUESTIONS?  H/$ ,?AY!_#w&()*+,-./01 ` 3` v3fff` ___>?" dd@,p?Kd@  @A@` n?" dd@   @@``@n?" dd@  @@``PV    @ ` `p>> R J   (  jL ;x\ # !x  H2?xx  H2?Dx\N ;9  ;98  s BACDE8F@@?saO@OaNs @;90  s BCDE4F<@? ;];h]h;@0  s BCDE4F<@? ' '"W W@cP   B|CDE4F<? *3?=G?{*SV{Gl=3l'V*@4   N($gֳgֳ ? $ RClick to edit Master text styles Second Level Third Level Fourth Level Fifth Level!     S   Z-$gֳgֳ ?` $ B*    Z/$gֳgֳ ?`uK  $ j(*PPL Susquehanna LLC  Z8$gֳgֳ ?` $ N*$T  <n޽h? ? 3 Sparkle5     ` i (   jL #x|  # #|x   H2?x(x   H2?dx|N #9   #98   s BACDE8F@@?saO@OaNs @#90   s BCDE4F<@? ;];h]h;@z0   s BCDE4F<@? ' '"W W@cPi   B|CDE4F<? *3?=G?{*SV{Gl=3l'V*@h   fC"gֳgֳ 5%5%?MV " T Click to edit Master title style! !  N|"gֳgֳ ? N  " W#Click to edit Master subtitle style$ $  Z,Sgֳgֳ ?VHpv " B*  ZTgֳgֳ ?V v   D*  Z Vgֳgֳ ?V*Rv  D*T  <n޽h? ? 30 p *(     0h     X*   0pl    Z* d  c $ ?D   0    RClick to edit Master text styles Second level Third level Fourth level Fifth level!     S  6     X*   6    Z* H  0޽h ? ̙33  04F( % 4l 4 C  8$  $  4 rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactP`H 4 0n޽h ? 3`  @ @(  @x @ c $T$    $ V @ S ~$gֳgֳF0WjJ?Susquehanna Steam Electric StationImpact X  $ <6    @ C bAJX:\FORMS\CORPCOM\Logos\Ppl-white.wmf`VH @ 0n޽h ? 3  c[P(    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPM  C  p  $ MManagement of Contamination Control Measurement Management Perception CultureP$ ZZ# + H  0n޽h ? 3 ! R( w x  c $dH 0    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH  0n޽h ? 3   L( 7v r  S  "    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH  0n޽h ? 3   L(  r  S 4N "`    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH  0n޽h ? 3   PL(  Pr P S Q "   P rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH P 0n޽h ? 3  HT(  Hz H C \    H rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH H 0n޽h ? 3 ( PR( e  Px P c $o" P` "  P rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH P 0n޽h ? 3  \Z( a@M@ \ \ S k    \ rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH \ 0n޽h ? 3 # R(  x  c $q `    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH  0n޽h ? 3   hL( 'H-C hr h S u    h rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH h 0n޽h ? 3  lR(  lx l c $}    l rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH l 0n޽h ? 3   hR(  hx h c $Hw    h rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH h 0n޽h ? 3 ) 0`R( (  `x ` c $,x    ` rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH ` 0n޽h ? 3 * @hR(  hx h c $    h rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH h 0n޽h ? 3& + Ppf( !z p p c $, `    p rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH p 0n޽h ? 3   `R(  x  c $ "`    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH  0n޽h ? 3   p`L( W `r ` S ĸ    ` rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH ` 0n޽h ? 3  R(  x  c $ȸ "    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH  0n޽h ? 3 , xR( $I xx x c $θ "   x rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH x 0n޽h ? 3   L(  r  S Ѹ P    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactP}H  0n޽h ? 3  $R( ]f $x $ c $ָ "   $ rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactP}H $ 0n޽h ? 3  R( !<K  x  c $<ڸ P"`    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactP}H  0n޽h ? 3 - R(  x  c $ݸ P"`    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactP}H  0n޽h ? 3 & R( w x  c $` "`    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactP}H  0n޽h ? 3 . R(  x  c $ "`    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactP}H  0n޽h ? 3 /  R(  x  c $   "`    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactP}H  0n޽h ? 3 0 R( t x  c $$  "`    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactP}H  0n޽h ? 3 1 R(  x  c $d  "`    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH  0n޽h ? 3 0 0T,(  T^ T S  D  $ T c $ $   $ " H T 0޽h ? ̙33 0 `l,(  l^ l S  D  $ l c $t$   $ " H l 0޽h ? ̙330 ,( d5 f ^  S  D  $  c $$$   $ " H  0޽h ? ̙330 ,(  ^  S  D  $  c $Լ$   $ " H  0޽h ? ̙330  ,(   ^   S  D  $   c $P$   $ " H   0޽h ? ̙33 0 (,(  (^ ( S  D  $ ( c $$   $ " H ( 0޽h ? ̙3310  ,(  ^  S  D  $  c $$   $ " H  0޽h ? ̙3350 P,(  ^  S  D    c $D    " H  0޽h ? ̙33F0 ,(  ^  S  D  $  c $$   $ " H  0޽h ? ̙33M0 @T,( Sr ? T^ T S  D  $ T c $L$   $ " H T 0޽h ? ̙33O0 pd,( ?7/ d^ d S  D  $ d c $$   $ " H d 0޽h ? ̙33P0 l,(  l^ l S  D  $ l c $̝$   $ " H l 0޽h ? ̙33Q0 t,(  t^ t S  D  $ t c $$   $ " H t 0޽h ? ̙33R0 |,(   |^ | S  D  $ | c $|$   $ " H | 0޽h ? ̙33S0 ,( ?$I ^  S  D  $  c $$   $ " H  0޽h ? ̙33T0 ,( > ^  S  D  $  c $@$   $ " H  0޽h ? ̙33U0  ,(  ^  S  D  $  c $l$   $ " H  0޽h ? ̙33V0 0,(  ^  S  D  $  c $$   $ " H  0޽h ? ̙33W0 @,(  ^  S  D  $  c $$   $ " H  0޽h ? ̙33r,0:IGaU Djxf0h!t$(,f;։>@J.OQ tvX d^ rv 8ګP[]Xltnp{,}FjN2Rl޼¾,  Oh+'0K px< T`    IHot Particle Issues Associated with the Spent Fuel Pool Cleanout ProjecteLicensed UserssMC:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Templates\presentation designs\Sparkle.pot\Lucie D'ASCENZO106Microsoft PowerPointoso@Q,@@/hO@r@ GIH  $1$& &&#TNPP2OMi & TNPP &&TNPP     1$A m(mʦ """)))UUUMMMBBB999|PP3f3333f333ff3fffff3f3f̙f3333f3333333333f3333333f3f33ff3f3f3f3333f3333333f3̙33333f333ff3ffffff3f33f3ff3f3f3ffff3fffffffff3fffffff3f̙ffff3ff333f3ff33fff33f3ff̙3f3f3333f333ff3fffff̙̙3̙f̙̙̙3f̙3f3f3333f333ff3fffff3f3f̙3ffffffffff!___www__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<___<_<_<<?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~Root EntrydO)PicturesCurrent UserMSummaryInformation(mKPowerPoint Document( V>DocumentSummaryInformation8l:( / 00DTimes New Roman8Y$bbv 0b( 0DMonotype Sorts8Y$bbv 0b( 0 DArialpe Sorts8Y$bbv 0b( 0"0DWingdingsorts8Y$bbv 0b( 0 ` .  @n?" dd@  @@`` XPh4)#&  *X   --[X"&% 0-   $   ( ) ,/12 3!4?$$2$LI˃+sȲc $ @8 g4JdJdv 0bppp` g4=d=dv 0bRppp@ <4BdBd` 0b$Z$b<4!d!d` 0b$Z$buʚ;2Nʚ;<4ddddb{ 0bb___PPT9/ 01 ,-(? +O =r,J RDiscrete Radioactive Particle Issues Associated with a Fuel Pool Cleanout Project*SR6,K ' Richard L. Doty and Richard C. KesslerH'$&$ X1 What s a Discrete Radioactive Particle (DRP)? A DRP is defined as a fragment that is less than 1 mm in any dimension (typically 10-20 microns in diameter) with a specific activity greater than or equal to 50,000 cpm.X.T-,($ OVERVIEW Project began in late June 2000 Control Rod Blade (CRB) processing began in July First particle exposure to a worker (0.12 Sv, SDE) was documented on September 8thT 06$,  First high activity particle (20 mGy/h) was identified on September 11th During removal of the Advanced Crusher Shearer on October 12th, a particle was identified with a measured contact dose rate of 8 Sv/h (a Telescan was used). Co-60 was identified via in-situ gamma spectroscopyB$$  DOn November 28th, a high activity particle was measured at 2.2 Sv/h on a cask. On December 6th, a high activity Co-60 particle was identified on a worker s shoe cover. The measured contact dose rate was 10 mSv/h. Overall, 36 particles were identified between September 8th & December 15th.*#"$L cDuring the project, no individual was exposed to doses in excess of SSES or regulatory dose limits.8d66N6M Assessments DRP of 8 Sv/h Series of DRP events Project management Independent oversight of project Critique of event evaluationsB u 6u$0N i8 Sv/h Co-60 DRP on skin can result in: 2,900 Gy/h shallow dose equivalent 2.3 Gy/h deep dose equivalentD(02Ai,0^5 yRegulatory Issues Significance Determination Process (SDP) identified a White Finding Notice of Violation - 10CFR20.1501P2g6g$0Q, rFrom the NRC Inspection report:  & (SSES) did not adequately evaluate and characterize the radiation exposure hazards posed by radioactive particles having highly significant activity. L ($R- From the NRC Inspection report:  & (SSES) did not establish and implement adequate radiological safety controls to prevent shallow dose equivalent (SDE) and deep-dose equivalent (DDE) personnel exposures from exceeding regulatory requirements. H  (  INPO Preliminary Operating Experience Report - Issued December 27, 2000 Assist Visit Recommendations - January Significant Event Report (SER) 3-01 - Issued March 30, 2001 F0$(O SER 3-01 Recommendations Documented guidance for establishing  HPCZ Thorough pre-job briefings Well-developed contamination control methods, considering all applicable industry events Senior management presence and communication of high standardsVZZ0>$(P WANO SER 2001-2 Risk assessments considering prior experience Contingency work plans for high-risk evolutions Thorough pre-job briefs and shift handoversR20(Q Susquehanna Perspective on Root Causes Inaccurate risk perception for exposure to DRP Process focus on actual doses vs. potential doses Inadequate pre-job plans for DRP controls Unresolved cultural issues regarding questioning attitude, communications, use of operating experienceZ'Z/2Z'0(! rWhat Have We Learned Lack of sensitivity to the consequences of highly radioactive material (particles) (Root Cause 2) Attitude that significant radiological events can t happen at SSEST0,(,O* What Have We Learned Particle assessments focused on actual doses versus potential doses (Root Cause 2) Inadequate pre-job plans were developed for the FPCO project for the control of particles (Root Cause 4)T0($(> What Have We Learned We need to improve control of radioactive material on refueling floor and in potentially impacted systemsT2j(6j$R What Have We Learned The associated vacuuming and filtration of the cask storage pit (CSP) were less than adequate to control the DRP source term. Rinsing of all items that were removed from the CSP and fuel pools was not performed for every evolution. F(6$; What Have We Learned Need to structure pre-job briefings for hot particle control zone (HPCZ) work Need specific RWPs for HPCZ work Need to consider the use of respiratory protection to prevent the intake of particles8($@  What Have We Learned Radiation Protection Technicians needed more training on DRP survey and containment techniques Self-assessment program was not sufficiently risk-oriented `0206(( Corrective Actions Revised RP procedures to enhance radiological controls Survey techniques Labeling and posting Dose rate limits and dress requirements Control of radioactive materialx7o6<7(n6S Corrective Actions Treat high risk/high consequence evolutions as special evolutions Add management oversight for high risk activities Focus self-assessment programT6<(vF *Summary Be proactive to potential conditions rather than reactive to emergent conditions When the mindset exists that  it can t happen here, it willT6<(6T sINPO SER 4-98 addressed precursors for unplanned exposures Three of the root causes aligned with the SER precursorsTo6<n(6U >INPO SER 4-98: Common Event Precursors Inaccurate or incomplete radiological surveys Inadequate work planning and radiation work permits Incorrect guidance provided by radiological protection technicians Non-compliance with radiological protection rules Ineffective supervisory and management direction and oversight8''(V Defense in Depth Strong management Comprehensive planning Accurate risk perception Culture of awareness and risk control Good measurement processes*(W  QUESTIONS?  H/$ ,?AY!_#w&()*+,-./01   p`L( W `r ` S ĸ    ` rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH ` 0n޽h ? 3  R( !<K  x  c $<ڸ P"`    rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactP}H  0n޽h ? 3r(OW :( / 00DTimes New Roman4bbv 0b( 0DMonotype Sorts4b  ՜.+,0<    (  PersonnalisnPennsylvania Power and LightoV>r #Times New RomanMonotype SortsArial WingdingsSparklePrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPointPrsentation PowerPoint Polices utilisesModle de conceptionTitres des diapositives'_2>Lucie D'ASCENZOLucie D'ASCENZOions Documented guidance for establishing  HPCZ Thorough pre-job briefings Well-developed contamination control methods, considering all applicable industry events Senior management presence and communication of high standardsVZZ0>$(P WANO SER 2001-2 Risk assessments considering prior experience Contingency work plans for high-risk evolutions Thorough pre-job briefs and shift handoversR20(Q Susquehanna Perspective on Root Causes Inaccurate risk perception for exposure to DRP Process focus on actual doses vs. potential doses Inadequate pre-job plans for DRP controls Unresolved cultural issues regarding questioning attitude, communications, use of operating experiencel'Z/2Z8Z'0(! rWhat Have We Learned Lack of sensitivity to the consequences of highly radioactive material (particles) (Root Cause 2) Attitude that significant radiological events can t happen at SSEST0,(,O* What Have We Learned Particle assessments focused on actual doses versus potential doses (Root Cause 2) Inadequate pre-job plans were developed for the FPCO project for the control of particles (Root Cause 4)T0($(> What Have We Learned We need to improve control of radioactive material on refueling floor and in potentially impacted systemsT2j(6j$R What Have We Learned The associated vacuuming and filtration of the cask storage pit (CSP) were less than adequate to control the DRP source term. Rinsing of all items that were removed from the CSP and fuel pools was not performed for every evolution. F(6$; What Have We Learned Need to structure pre-job briefings for hot particle control zone (HPCZ) work Need specific RWPs for HPCZ work Need to consider the use of respiratory protection to prevent the intake of particles8($@  What Have We Learned Radiation Protection Technicians needed more training on DRP survey and containment techniques Self-assessment program was not sufficiently risk-oriented `0206(( Corrective Actions Revised RP procedures to enhance radiological controls Survey techniques Labeling and posting Dose rate limits and dress requirements Control of radioactive materialx7o6<7(n6S Corrective Actions Treat high risk/high consequence evolutions as special evolutions Add management oversight for high risk activities Focus self-assessment programT6<(vF *Summary Be proactive to potential conditions rather than reactive to emergent conditions When the mindset exists that  it can t happen here, it willT6<(6T sINPO SER 4-98 addressed precursors for unplanned exposures Three of the root causes aligned with the SER precursorsTo6<n(6U >INPO SER 4-98: Common Event Precursors Inaccurate or incomplete radiological surveys Inadequate work planning and radiation work permits Incorrect guidance provided by radiological protection technicians Non-compliance with radiological protection rules Ineffective supervisory and management direction and oversight8''(V Defense in Depth Strong management Comprehensive planning Accurate risk perception Culture of awareness and risk control Good measurement processes*(W  QUESTIONS?  H/$ ,?AY!_#w&()*+,-./01& + @pf( !z p p c $ `    p rWjJ?DRP IssuesImpactPMH p 0n޽h ? 3r&;Q >