


2022



INFORMATION SYSTEM ON OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE

# [ISOE Country Reports]

## Foreword

Throughout the world, occupational exposure at nuclear power plants has steadily decreased since the early 1990s. Contributing to this downward trend are effective “as low as reasonably achievable” (ALARA) regulations, new technologies, plant design modifications, improved water chemistry and operational ALARA awareness, as well as senior plant management support of a strong ALARA culture and global exchange of ALARA experiences. However, with the continued ageing and life extensions of nuclear power plants worldwide, ongoing economic pressures, regulatory, social and political evolutions, along with the potential of new nuclear build, including small modular reactors (SMRs), the task of ensuring that occupational exposures are ALARA continues to present challenges to radiation protection professionals, in particular when taking into account operational costs and social factors.

Since 1992, the Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE), jointly administered by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has provided a forum for radiological protection professionals from nuclear power licensees and national regulatory authorities worldwide to discuss, promote and co-ordinate international co-operative undertakings for the radiological protection of workers at nuclear power plants. The objective of the ISOE is to improve the management of occupational exposures at nuclear power plants by exchanging broad and regularly updated information, data and experience on methods to optimise occupational radiological protection and ALARA lessons learnt.

As a technical exchange initiative, the ISOE includes a global occupational exposure data collection and analysis programme, culminating in the world’s largest occupational exposure database for nuclear power plants, and an information network for sharing dose-reduction data and experience. Since its launch, ISOE participants have used this system of databases and communications networks to exchange occupational exposure data and information for dose trend analyses, technique comparisons, and cost-benefit and other analyses promoting the application of the ALARA principle in plant radiological protection programmes.

With new nuclear power plants commencing commercial operation, and some others transitioning into the decommissioning phase, the ISOE programme continues to evolve to embrace the ALARA information sharing of global nuclear power to ensure safe and efficient electric generation.

This special edition of country reports presents dose information and principal events of the year 2022 in 29 out of 31 ISOE countries and will be incorporated into the Thirty-Second Annual Report of the ISOE programme.

The 2022 country reports are presented in the authors’ wording, with the exception of minor editorial changes.

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## Introduction

Since 1992, the Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE) has supported the optimisation of the radiological protection (RP) of workers in nuclear power plants through a worldwide information and experience exchange network for RP professionals at nuclear utilities and for national regulatory authorities, as well as through the publication of relevant technical resources for as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) management. This special edition of country reports presents dose information and principal events of the year 2022 from 29 out of 31 ISOE countries and will be incorporated into the Thirty-Second Annual Report of the ISOE programme.

The ISOE is jointly administrated by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its membership is open to nuclear licensees and radiological protection regulatory authorities worldwide who accept the programme's terms and conditions. The ISOE terms and conditions for the period of 2020-2023 came into force on 1 January 2020. As of 31 December 2022, the ISOE programme included 77 participating nuclear licensees (with 351 operating units, 70 shutdown units, and 16 units under construction and/or commissioning) and 27 regulatory authorities in 31 countries.

While the ISOE is well known for its occupational exposure data and analyses, the programme's strength comes from its efforts to share such information broadly amongst its participants. In 2022, the ISOE network website ([www.isoe-network.net](http://www.isoe-network.net)) continued to supply the ISOE membership with comprehensive web-based information and experience exchange portal on dose reduction and ISOE ALARA resources.

The ISOE Technical Centres continued to host international and regional fora, which in 2022 included: (1) ISOE international symposium organised by the European Technical Centre (ETC) in Tours (France) in June, with 104 participants from 19 countries and 9 vendors; (2) ISOE North American ALARA symposium organised by the North American Technical Centre (NATC) in Key West (USA) in January, with 112 participants from 3 Countries and 26 vendors; and (3) ISOE information exchange meeting on benchmarking for radiation protection organised by the Asian Technical Centre (ATC) at Higashidori Nuclear Power Station in Aomori (Japan) in December, with 15 participants from 2 countries.

The 2022 country reports are presented in the authors' wording, with the exception of minor editorial changes.

## Principal events in participating countries

### Armenia

#### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
VVER	1	823.167*
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
VVER	1	- **

\* The data is provided for the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant staff.

\*\* There is no separate record of collective doses for unit 1 and unit 2 of Armenian Nuclear Power Plant. The systems and components of unit 1 are used for the needs of unit 2.

#### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

##### *Organisational evolutions*

Additional radiation control barriers installed.

##### *Regulatory requirements*

Norms and Rules of Radiation Safety of the Republic of Armenia.

#### 3) Report from authority

In order to further implement the ALARA principle in Armenian Nuclear Power Plant, the “Programme for ensuring radiation protection of Armenian Nuclear Power Plant” was developed which sets the objectives and tasks to minimise the radiation impact and ensure the effective radiation protection for the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant personnel.

The goal was to maintain the annual collective dose of personnel exposure at the lowest possible and achievable level.

A comparative analysis of the values of radioactive emissions into the atmosphere in 2022 shows that they are at the level of the previous year and below the average level for the entire period of operation. Radionuclides  $^{131}\text{I}$ ,  $^{137}\text{Cs}$ ,  $^{60}\text{Co}$  and  $^{110\text{m}}\text{Ag}$  make the main contribution to the releases (excluding radioactive noble gases). An expected increase in emissions of radionuclides of corrosive origin during the period of the planned outage was recorded.

A comparative analysis of the received information and the data bank on the radiation situation for the entire period of operation of Armenian Nuclear Power Plant shows that the radiation situation in the observation zone of the plant has not changed significantly. An analysis of the calculated data on exposure doses to the critical group of the population (Metsamor) shows that the exposure dose to the population due to the impact of Armenian Nuclear Power Plant is many times less than the exposure dose limit established in the radiation safety standards.

## Belgium

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	7	193.57

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### *Events influencing dosimetric trends*

#### *a) Annual doses information*

Data for calendar year 2022 (01/01/2022-31/12/2022):

Operational units:

- Doel 1 and 2: 396 person·mSv (for reactors D1 and D2 combined);
- Doel 3: 37 person·mSv (01/01/2022-23/09/2022);
- Doel 4: 5 person·mSv;
- Tihange 1: 300 person·mSv;
- Tihange 2: 218 person·mSv;
- Tihange 3: 239 person·mSv.

Decommissioning units:

1 in post-operation phase (POP) since 24/09/2022:

- Doel 3: 160 person·mSv (24/09/2022-31/12/2022).

### *Outage information*

*Note that the information provided below is for outages which started in 2022.*

Duration and total collective dose during outage:

- Doel 1: 06/2022-07/2022 (214 person·mSv);
- Doel 2: 04/2022-04/2022 (146 person·mSv);
- Doel 3: no outage started in 2022 → POP started on 24/09/2022;
- Doel 4: no outage started in 2022;
- Tihange 1: 04/2022-09/2022 (288 person·mSv);
- Tihange 2: 06/2022-08/2022 (188 person·mSv);
- Tihange 3: 02/2022-04/2022 (216 person·mSv).

Reactor specific (details are provided if the collective dose objective has been exceeded):

- At Doel 1, the dose objective was exceeded by 8% (199 person·mSv). This can mainly be attributed to technical issues during inspections of the reactor pressure vessel penetrations and dose intensive works below the reactor pressure vessel, on one hand, and to delays during the closure of the reactor (decontamination lasted longer than expected, cable tray of thermocouple got damaged and required repair), on the other hand.
- At Doel 2, the dose objective was respected.
- No outage started at Doel 3 in 2022.
- No outage started at Doel 4 in 2022.
- At Tihange 1, the dose objective was exceeded by 1% (284 person·mSv). This can be attributed to the substantial outage prolongation due to the erosion issue of three main feed water regulating valves and the replacement of the seals of the primary pumps.
- At Tihange 2, the dose objective was respected.
- At Tihange 3, the dose objective was respected.

### *Component or system replacements*

The radiation monitoring system (RMS) chains, which are of critical importance for the safe operation of nuclear power plants, suffer from obsolescence at both sites. Multiple projects are ongoing to address this problem at both sites, though the urgency and severity is higher at Tihange Nuclear Power Plant compared to Doel Nuclear Power Plant.

### *Unexpected events/incidents*

At Doel Nuclear Power Plant, several radiological events were reported to the authorities (non-exhaustive):

- In March 2022, a radioactive transport from Tihange Nuclear Power Plant, arriving at Doel Nuclear Power Plant, did not comply with the ADR7 transport regulations as it did not hold a UN number and no sender was mentioned. Forgetfulness was at the root of the event.
- In October 2022, it was observed that two lightly contaminated filters (1 480 Bq Co-60 in total) ended up in the clearance flow and were sent to a conventional waste treatment firm without respecting the clearance limits. This event was identified during the archiving of the clearance files, three months after removal from site, and was caused by human errors as the quality control RP agent correctly identified these filters as non-clearable, though they were not removed from the clearance flow (neither in the RCA nor at the gate to leave the RCA). The safety authorities performed a reactive inspection and observed three legal infractions, amongst which non-respect of the clearance levels, at the same time appreciating the immediate actions taken to avoid recurrences. The impact on the population/environment was assessed as negligible (average bulk concentration < clearance levels). The safety authorities stressed that similar incidents must be avoided as clearance is a delicate process, i.e. social acceptance must not be jeopardized. The event was evaluated as International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) level 0.
- In October 2022, workers got contaminated while attempting to close and clean up a leak that had occurred during the pushing of a thimble. The towels used to clean up the contaminated primary water gave rise to a dose rate of 18 mSv/h and caused a radiation monitoring chain to go in alarm. The works were paused until an in-depth analysis was performed.
- In November 2022, an active charcoal filter, including its metallic grid and bottom plate, of the RMS chain for measuring accidental stack releases from the auxiliary and spent fuel building of Doel 4 was found to be severely damaged, most likely due to a very high temperature generated during certain tests. The event itself did not impact the stack release accountancy. The chain was declared unavailable and other chains were verified to check if the same issue had occurred. The chain was unavailable for more than 30 days. The event was evaluated as INES level 0.
- In December 2022, a hotspot of 29.5 kBq (mainly Co-60, Co-58, Mn-54) was detected on the concrete road in front of the gate of the nuclear auxiliary building outside the RCA of Doel 1 and

2 in the framework of a yearly on-site monitoring programme. The piece of concrete was removed and likely originates from the nuclear auxiliary building of Doel 1 and 2.

At Tihange Nuclear Power Plant, several radiological events were reported to the authorities (non-exhaustive):

- In March 2022, in the framework of an ageing evaluation, it was highlighted that the structure of two RMS chains of Tihange 1 would not withstand an earthquake as they were not properly anchored. Repair works were performed in the short term to ensure the availability of the RMS chains.
- In March 2022, two significant radioactive spills occurred at Tihange 2. Both events were evaluated as INES level 0:
  - A leak occurred at a seal of a tank (surface area 18 m<sup>2</sup>, activity 104 MBq/m<sup>3</sup>). The root cause of the event could not be identified. Nevertheless, associated causes are the absence of a procedure for the opening/sealing of the tank and the lack of surveillance of the parameters during effluent treatment.
  - An overspill of a tank occurred (surface area 12 m<sup>2</sup>, activity 146 MBq/m<sup>3</sup>). A lack of adequate analysis during the modification of this tank and lack of preventive maintenance of tank components were identified as the causes.
- In May 2022, a radioactive spill occurred outside the RCA of Tihange 1 following the tilting of a liquid waste drum (30 MBq/m<sup>3</sup>). The contamination on the floor amounted to around 300 kBq. The contaminated soil/concrete was removed and stored in a drum to be measured in view of clearance or radioactive waste management. The root causes of this event were:
  - Unreliable work practices (non-strapped drum) and the use of inadequate material for the transfer of liquid effluents drums.
  - Insufficiently developed/documented expectations with respect to radioactive liquid transfer.
  - Lack of coordination between different services.
- In July 2022, a significant radioactive spill was observed in the auxiliary building of Tihange 3 over six floors (up to 6 MBq/m<sup>3</sup> over 100 m<sup>2</sup>). The cause of the event was a defective valve.
- In August 2022, a delay in the calibration of the Tihange 2 reactor building RMS chain led to its unavailability. The event was evaluated as INES level 0. Additional checks on the other units demonstrated that no similar gap was observed. The causes of this event were related to an error during the administrative closure of the previous calibration work order, lack of training on

different types of maintenance plans, and non-finalised actions defined in a previous event report.

- In October 2022, a significant radioactive spill (2 MBq/m<sup>3</sup> over 30 m<sup>2</sup>) was observed in the Tihange 3 reactor building following some tests. The event was evaluated at INES level 0. One agent was contaminated following this spill. The direct cause of the spill was the rupture of a hosepipe due to overpressure, and the root cause was the absence of overpressure protection.
- In October 2022, a clearance of 207 kg of waste occurred without prior validation by an RP agent. This observation consisted in a non-conformity with the Belgian legislation. Not all waste could be retrieved for validation. Independent check of the retrieved waste confirmed their clearance. The causes of the event were a lack of a prudent attitude from different stakeholders and a non-respect of the recently modified clearance process.
- In October 2022, an uncontrolled release of gaseous effluents, without prior analysis, was observed leading to a non-compliance with the operational limits and conditions. A lineage issue was at the origin of the event as well as a lack of questioning attitude.

#### ***New/experimental dose-reduction programmes***

- In 2018, analysis by ENGIE Laborelec revealed that a <sup>110m</sup>Ag contamination of the primary circuit at Tihange 1 and Tihange 2 was responsible for half of the dose rate contribution in some circuits linked to the primary circuits such as the reactor heat removal system. At Tihange, an inventory was made of all components containing silver, mainly seals. Maintenance launched an inspection plan to identify any components causing the contamination that could be replaced. The inspection plan was carried out at Tihange 1, but no root cause could be identified. In 2020, ENGIE Laborelec attempted to identify the source of silver contamination using two distinct approaches. The first approach, which consisted of a morphological examination of silver particles in the reactor coolant of Tihange 1 and Tihange 2, showed to be unsuccessful. The second approach, which relied on an analysis of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head seal of Tihange 1, could not narrow down the exact cause of the silver contamination either. Because of this, ENGIE Laborelec recommended to verify and evaluate the feasibility of replacing primary circuit seals and those of the residual heat removal system (RHRS) valves containing silver. Both recommendations were considered as not feasible by Tihange Nuclear Power Plant. Tihange requested ENGIE Laborelec to perform the same RPV head seal analysis at Doel 1-2 as done at Tihange 1: if the same defects were observed, they could then be excluded as potential source of silver contamination in Tihange 1 because there was no similar problem in Doel 3 and it was the same seal as in Tihange 1 and 2. The analysis of the RPV head of Doel 3, however, did not show defects. Nevertheless, Doel Nuclear Power Plant informed Tihange that the clips maintaining the RPV head seal were not positioned in the same way as in Tihange Nuclear Power Plant. Following this, in early 2022, an inspection was performed to compare the clips on the RPV head seal of both nuclear power plants. Based on the non-conclusive results, it was decided to stop searching for the origin of the <sup>110m</sup>Ag contamination in Tihange 1 and 2. Operating Experience (OE) of EDF also confirmed that <sup>110m</sup>Ag contaminations were present in several nuclear power plants without specific

action plans other than operational management of the  $^{110m}\text{Ag}$  activity (specific management of resins, adapted shutdown procedure, etc.).

- A zinc injection programme aiming at decreasing the dose rate in the primary circuit was implemented at Doel 3 in 2011. This injection programme was still ongoing in 2022. The evolution of the dose rate is followed up by means of a radiation monitoring system. Over the past years, a decreasing trend was observed. At the end of 2021, however, it was observed that the ambient radiation levels in the zone around the coolers of the spent fuel pools of Doel 3 and in certain rooms of the auxiliary building (particularly around the chemistry and volume control [CV] pumps) of Doel 3 had increased significantly. Several analyses showed that  $^{110m}\text{Ag}$  was responsible for nearly 100% of the dose rate around the coolers of the spent fuel pools and CV pumps, but the exact origin of the increased  $^{110m}\text{Ag}$  levels could not be identified. In the second half of 2022, the temperature in the CV circuit was increased in an attempt to release and capture  $^{110m}\text{Ag}$  particles. Overall, the observed effect was very limited. At the end of 2022, the ambient dose rates around the shutdown circuit (SC) increased after the permanent shutdown of Doel 3. Extended purification did not improve the situation. The origin of the  $^{110m}\text{Ag}$  contamination could not be identified, but the production of  $^{110m}\text{Ag}$  had stopped due to the permanent shutdown of the reactor. Chemical system decontamination (CSD) at Doel 3, which is scheduled for March/April 2023, should reduce the ambient radiation levels to very low or negligible.

### ***Organisational evolutions***

- Around mid-2022, ENGIE Electrabel and the Belgian government signed a “non-binding letter of intent” with a view of evaluating the feasibility and conditions of a 10-year lifetime extension of Doel 4 and Tihange 3. This letter of intent marked the start of negotiations with the aim of reaching a legally binding agreement by the end of 2022. This agreement must guarantee a balanced distribution of risks and opportunities and ensure long-term stability for all concerned. The concretisation of all elements will take time and require major efforts from all parties involved. In the meantime, ENGIE Electrabel will continue working constructively with the Belgian government to ensure security of electricity supply in Belgium.
- At the end of September 2022 (23/09/2022), Doel 3 was permanently shut down after a last cycle with 100% availability and no incidents. Since then, the Post-Operational Phase (POP) started. This phase ends with the removal of the last irradiated fuel elements and as much as possible of the radioactive waste/materials present inside the RCA. During the POP, in principle, nothing is (allowed to be) dismantled in the nuclear installations. The objective is to remove the largest sources of radioactivity so that the collective dose during the actual dismantling activities can be ALARA. The POP can be divided into four stages which are related to a group of pre-determined activities:
  - Stage 1 starts with stopping the reactor and disconnecting it from the power grid. The reactor is unloaded and the fuel assemblies, control rods and other non-fissile highly radiating components are transferred to the spent fuel pools. The stage ends when the reactor is fully emptied.

- Stage 2 involves chemical decontamination of the primary circuits. The other circuits in the RCA (except around the fuel pools) are emptied and cleaned.
- Stage 3 ends when the fuel assemblies are removed from the fuel pools. After the residual heat is sufficiently reduced, the elements are loaded into containers and transported to a fuel container building. The non-fissionable highly radioactive components present in the fuel pools are disposed of as radioactive waste. The remaining circuits are taken out of service.
- Stage 4 involves emptying and cleaning of the fuel pools and related circuits. After the end of stage 4, the plant will be ready for dismantling.

Currently, it is envisioned to end the POP for Doel 3 in early 2028.

- Throughout 2022, the decommissioning programme within ENGIE Electrabel underwent several structural changes in an attempt to better prepare the organisation for the current and future challenges. With regards to radiation protection, the decommissioning programme understood the crucial importance of radiological characterisation, and set up specific processes/projects to deal with these subjects. Additional organisational changes are expected to take place in 2023 following the likely scenario of long-term operation (LTO) for Doel 4 and Tihange 3.

### ***Regulatory requirements***

In 2022, the Belgian regulatory framework relative to radiation protection did not undergo major changes (as compared to 2020<sup>\*</sup>). Nevertheless, the implementation of the technical regulations relative to industrial radiography and the accreditation of anthropogammametry services, as announced in 2021 and evaluated to have a high impact on the operational practices adopted at Doel and Tihange Nuclear Power Plants, progressed further in 2022.

A revision of the technical regulation relative to clearance measurement procedures and techniques has been announced and is expected by the end of 2023. Depending on the modifications, this revision might have an important impact on the clearance processes.

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<sup>\*</sup> Reported in the 30<sup>th</sup> ISOE Annual Report (2020).


## Brazil

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	2	558.71 (Angra 1: 563.71 + Angra 2: 553.71)

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

- Transfer of irradiated fuel elements from Angra 1 to UAS – Transfers of 222 fuel elements in normal operation. Collective dose: 8.48 person·mSv.




Unit	Days of outage	Outage information
Angra 1	41	Refuelling and maintenance activities
Angra 2	45	Refuelling and maintenance activities

## Bulgaria

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
VVER-1000	2	206
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
VVER-440	4	29

### Summary of dosimetric trends



Unit No.	Outage duration, days	Outage information
Kozloduy Unit 5	35	Refuelling and maintenance activities
Kozloduy Unit 6	37	Refuelling and maintenance activities

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### Events influencing dosimetric trends

The collective dose denotes the sum of the individual doses of all workers with measurable individual doses. The average collective dose is obtained by dividing the collective dose by the total number of the respective reactor units under consideration.

The average collective dose of reactors under decommissioning is calculated for four VVER-440 reactors. The collective dose of the reactors under decommissioning increased about three times

because of the decontamination and dismantling activities performed in the controlled areas of Kozloduy units 3 and 4. For the time being, the doses associated with the decommissioning activities are kept low.

The average collective dose of operating reactors is calculated for two VVER-1000 reactors. The collective dose for the year 2022 is almost the same as for the previous year 2021. The recorded increase, in comparison to 2019 and 2020, is due to the planned maintenance works performed in a higher dose rate environment. In general, there is a stable trend of maintaining low levels of the collective dose at the operating reactors through the years.

### ***Operating reactors***

The collective dose related to the operating units is only due to external exposure. In 2022, there were no doses imparted by internal exposure.

The main contributors to the collective dose were the works carried out during the outages. The outage activities resulted in about 88% of the total collective dose. Some of the maintenance works which have contributed significantly to the radiation exposure are:

- maintenance works at the reactor vessel;
- utilisation of neutron in-core detectors;
- corrosion examination;
- radiography and eddy current testing;
- thermal insulation replacement.

Additional radiation protection measures were planned and implemented for the works with higher radiation risks.

There were no unexpected radiological events/incidents reported to the authorities in 2022.

### ***Organisational evolutions***

The implementation of the radiation protection optimisation principle remained the main driving force in the field of radiation protection in 2022.

In 2022, the project for the characterisation of radiation contamination in the radiologically controlled area (RCA) was finished. The performed source term detailed investigation, including the difficulty to measure radionuclides, is aimed at improvement of the contamination control and contamination spread measures.

Some modifications of the radiological risk assessment criteria were also implemented, which was very beneficial for the radiation work permit (RWP) system.

Practical training on the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) was organised for the maintenance personnel before the outages.

### ***Regulatory requirements***

There were no significant changes in the radiation protection regulatory requirements in 2022. The requirements, rules and restrictions in the field of radiation protection are defined in regulations:

- on the radiation protection;
- for providing the safety of nuclear power plants;
- for the procedure of issuing licenses and permits for safe use of nuclear energy;
- for emergency preparedness and response;
- on radiation protection during activities with radiation non-destructive testing detectors.

All radiation protection programmes, guides and instructions used in the nuclear industry are based on the above regulatory documents.

## Canada

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PHWR (CANDU)	16.12	959.2 (15 462.1 person·mSv / 16.12 units)
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PHWR (CANDU)	1	5.9
PHWR (CANDU)	2	Dose associated with PNGS U2, U3 is negligible (< 1 person·mSv/unit) and included in PNGS operating dose
REACTORS UNDER REFURBISHMENT		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PHWR (CANDU)	2.88	5 092.3 (14 665.9 person·mSv / 2.88 units)

**Operating reactors** – Reactors that have operated in the year 2022 including collective dose from all type of operations: normal operations, planned outage and forced outage. It excludes dose values from units that were under refurbishment or have been shut down.

**Reactors definitively shut down or in decommissioning** – Reactors that have been shut down through the year 2022. Pickering unit 2 and unit 3 are in safe storage. The dose associated with safe storage is negligible (< 1 person·mSv). Any dose related to accessing safe storage units is included in Pickering Nuclear Generating Station (PNGS) operating reactor dose. The average dose in this category includes dose reported from Gentilly-2 only.

**Reactors under refurbishment** – Reactors that were in refurbishment in 2022. Bruce Power unit 6 and Darlington unit 3 were under refurbishment through the year 2022. 1 full refurbishment unit represents a unit that is in refurbishment for the entire calendar year. Darlington unit 1 began refurbishment in February 2022, accounting for 0.88 of a refurbishment reactor. Bruce Power unit 6 refurbishment dose is 4 355.0 person·mSv, Darlington unit 1 refurbishment dose is 7 017.9 person·mSv, and Darlington unit 3 refurbishment dose is 3 293.0 person·mSv.

## 2) Principal events of the year 2022

2022 ANNUAL OPERATING REACTORS COLLECTIVE DOSE							
Nuclear station	Number of reactors in operation	Number of reactors in refurbishment	Number of reactors in shutdown	Operating dose including outages [person·mSv]	Average operating dose [person·mSv/unit]	Refurbishment dose [person·mSv]	Average refurbishment dose [person·mSv/unit]
Bruce A	4	0	0	6 579.9	1 645.0	0	0
Bruce B	3	1	0	2 825.5	941.8	4 355.0	4 355.0
Darlington	2.12	1.88	0	641.7	302.7	10 310.9	5 484.5
Gentilly-2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Pickering	6	0	2	4 032.4	672.1	0	0
Point Lepreau	1	0	0	1 382.6	1 382.6	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>16.12</b>	<b>2.88</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>15 462.1</b>	<b>959.2</b>	<b>14 665.9</b>	<b>5 092.3</b>

There are 22 units in total from all the CANDU nuclear stations combined. 16.12 of the reactors were in operation, 2.88 were in refurbishment, and 3 reactors were in the shutdown state during the year 2022. Darlington unit 1 began refurbishment in February 2022, accounting for 0.12 of an operating reactor and 0.88 of a refurbishment reactor in 2022. The above table's columns are organised accordingly. 2022 operating dose values include dose values from normal operations, planned outage and forced outages during the year. Refurbishment dose values are separated into their own category and stated accordingly.

### *Principal events in Canada:*

2022 OPERATING REACTORS						
Nuclear station, unit	Days in normal operations (2022)	Normal operations dose [person·mSv]	Planned outage dose [person·mSv]	Forced outage dose [person·mSv]	Outage ID: Outage information	Annual collective unit dose [person·mSv]
<b>Bruce A, U1</b>	343.0	122.5	42.3	10.0	A2211 – Planned outage (19 days): Vacuum building outage F2211 – Forced outage (2 days): Unit 1 was removed from service for a 2-day forced outage due to a moderator leak. F2212 – Forced outage (1 day): No dose associated with F2212.	174.8
<b>Bruce A, U2</b>	311.6	122.5	2 041.7	0.0	A2221 – Planned outage (53.4 days): Significant scope included primary vessel inspection and maintenance, as well as reactor face inspections and maintenance.	2 164.2
<b>Bruce A, U3</b>	331.5	122.5	283.3	292.8	A2231 – Planned outage (17 days): Vacuum building outage.	698.6

					<p>F2231 – Forced outage (4.5 days): No dose associated with F2231.</p> <p>F2232 – Forced outage (7 days): Unit 3 was removed from service for a 7-day forced outage to resolve turbine governor control issues.</p> <p>F2233 – Forced outage (5 days): Unit 3 was removed from service for a 5-day forced outage to resolve a leak in the primary heat transport system.</p>	
<b>Bruce A, U4</b>	250.1	122.5	3 419.8	0.0	<p>A2241 – Planned outage (97.7 days): Significant scope included primary vessel inspection and maintenance, as well as reactor face inspections and maintenance.</p> <p>A2242 – Planned outage (17.2 days): Vacuum building outage.</p>	3 542.3
<b>Bruce Power Nuclear Generating Station A, units 1-4</b>						<b>6 579.9</b>
<b>Bruce B, U5</b>	282.8	162.3	2 135.9	36.4	<p>B2251 – Planned outage (77.2 days): Significant scope included primary vessel inspection and maintenance, as well as reactor face inspections and maintenance.</p> <p>F2251 – Forced outage (2 days): No dose associated with F2251.</p> <p>F2252 – Forced outage (3 days): Unit 5 was removed from service for a 3-day forced outage to repair the east fuel handling bridge.</p>	2 334.6
<b>Bruce B, U7</b>	340.5	162.2	117.0	0.0	<p>B2171 – Planned outage (22.5 days in 2022): Significant scope included primary vessel inspection and maintenance as well as reactor face inspections and maintenance.</p> <p>F2271 – Forced outage (2 days): No dose associated with F2271.</p>	279.2
<b>Bruce B, U8</b>	358.0	162.3	0.0	49.4	<p>F2281 – Forced outage (7 days): Unit 8 was removed from service for a 7-day forced outage to troubleshoot and repair a failure on the west fuel handling bridge.</p>	211.7
<b>Bruce Power Nuclear Generating Station B, units 5, 7 and 8</b>						<b>2 825.5</b>
<b>Darlington, U1</b>	46.0	20.5	0.0	0.0	No outage dose.	20.5
<b>Darlington, U2</b>	292.5	115.7	251.3	16.6	D2221 – Planned outage (45.1 days):	383.6

					Major work scope included Mo-99 Target Delivery System installation and pressurizer heater repair. Top three dose contributors were new modification of emergency coolant injection bands, start-up instrumentation, and pre-requisite support for universal delivery machine. D2222 – Forced outage (20.5 days): Unit 2 forced outage for reactor area bridge brakes maintenance. D2223 – Forced outage (6.9 days): Unit 2 forced outage for intercept stop valves repairs.	
<b>Darlington, U4</b>	342.0	125.7	0.0	111.9	D2241 – Forced outage (4.9 days): No dose associated with D2241. D2242 – Forced outage (18.1 days): Unit 4 forced outage for feeder instrument line repairs.	237.6
<b>Darlington Nuclear Generating Station, units 1, 2 and 4</b>						<b>641.7</b>
<b>Pickering, U1</b>	250.0	146.6	1 801.6	0.0	P2211 – Planned outage (115 days): Planned outage beginning in September 2022.	1 948.2
<b>Pickering, U4</b>	334.0	146.6	45.5	0.0	P2241 – Planned outage (31 days): Vacuum building outage.	192.1
<b>Pickering, U5</b>	201.0	146.6	1 174.1	0.0	P2251 – Planned outage (130 days): Planned outage beginning in January 2022. P2252 – Planned outage (31 days): Vacuum building outage. P2253 – Forced outage (1 day): Forced extension to P2252 planned outage. P2254 – Forced outage (2 days): No dose associated with P2254.	1 320.7
<b>Pickering, U6</b>	329.0	146.6	11.8	0.0	P2261 – Planned outage (29 days): Vacuum building outage. P2262 – Forced outage (7 days): Forced outage beginning in December 2022.	158.4
<b>Pickering, U7</b>	331.0	146.6	96.8	0	P2271 – Planned outage (28 days): Vacuum building outage. P2272 – Planned Outage (6 days):	243.4

					Planned outage beginning September 2022.	
<b>Pickering, U8</b>	322.0	146.6	18.0	5.0	P2281 – Planned outage (29 days): Vacuum building outage. P2282 – Forced outage (11 days): Forced outage beginning in April 2022. P2283 – Forced outage (3 days): Forced outage beginning in May 2022.	169.6
<b>Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, units 1, 4-8</b>						<b>4 032.4</b>
<b>Point Lepreau</b>	228.0	175.5	1 177.2	29.9	Planned outage (111 days): Planned outage beginning in April 2022. Forced outage (26 days combined): 2 forced outages in August (~8 days) and December (~18 days).	1 382.6
<b>Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station</b>						<b>1 382.6</b>

<b>2022 REACTORS UNDER REFURBISHMENT/REFURBISHED</b>				
<b>Nuclear power plant, refurbishment unit</b>	<b>Days in refurbishment (2022)</b>	<b>Internal dose [person·mSv]</b>	<b>External dose [person·mSv]</b>	<b>Annual collective unit dose [person·mSv]</b>
<b>Bruce B, U6</b>	365.0	26.3	4 328.7	4 355.0
<b>Darlington, U1</b>	319.0	109.5	6 908.4	7 017.9
<b>Darlington, U3</b>	365.0	38.0	3 255.0	3 293.0

### ***Bruce A (BNGS-A)***

In 2022, all four units were operational at Bruce A Nuclear Generating Station. All four units had 1 planned outage due to a vacuum building outage and unit 4 had 1 additional planned outage. Bruce unit 1 had 2 forced outages, and unit 3 had 3 forced outages. Bruce A, units 1-4 routine operations dose for 2022 was 490 person·mSv. The total outage dose was 6 089.9 person·mSv. The collective dose for Bruce A units 1-4 was 6 579.9 person·mSv which resulted in an average collective dose of 1 645.0 person·mSv/unit.

### ***Bruce B (BNGS-B)***

In 2022, Bruce B units 5, 7 and 8 were operational. Bruce unit 5 and unit 7 each had 1 planned outage. Bruce unit 7 and unit 8 each had 1 forced outage, and unit 5 had 2 forced outages. The routine operations dose for Bruce B for 2022 was 486.8 person·mSv. The total outage dose was 2 338.7 person·mSv. The collective dose for Bruce B units 5, 7 and 8 was 2 825.5 person·mSv which resulted in an average collective dose of 941.8 person·mSv/unit. Refurbishment dose from unit 6 was excluded from collective dose and analysed separately.

Bruce B, unit 6 was in refurbishment throughout 2022. The Unit 6 refurbishment dose for 2021 was 4 355.0 person·mSv.

### ***Darlington (DNGS)***

In 2022, Darlington unit 2 and unit 4 were operational. Unit 1 was operational in January and began refurbishment in February 2022. Unit 2 had 1 planned outage and 2 forced outages, and unit 4 had 2 forced outages. The routine operations dose for Darlington was 261.9 person·mSv. The outage dose was 379.8 person·mSv. The collective dose was 641.7 person·mSv which resulted in an average collective dose of 302.7 person·mSv/unit. Refurbishment dose from unit 1 and unit 3 was excluded from collective dose and evaluated separately.

Darlington unit 1 began refurbishment in February 2022. The unit 1 refurbishment dose for 2022 was 7 017.9 person·mSv.

Darlington unit 3 was in refurbishment throughout 2022. The unit 3 refurbishment dose for 2022 was 3 293.0 person·mSv.

### ***Pickering (PNGS)***

In 2022, Pickering Nuclear Generating Station had six units in operation (units 1, 4-8). All six units had 1 planned outage due to a vacuum building outage, and units 5 and 7 each had 1 additional planned outage. Units 5 and 8 each had 2 forced outages, and unit 6 had 1 forced outage. Units 2 and 3 continued to remain in a safe storage state, and dose associated with these units is included in routine operations. The routine operations dose for Pickering was 879.6 person·mSv. The outage dose was 3 152.8 person·mSv. The collective dose was 4 032.4 person·mSv which resulted in an average collective dose of 672.1 person·mSv/unit.

### ***Point Lepreau (PLNGS)***

Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station (PLNGS) is a single unit station. During 2022, the station was operational. The station had 1 planned outage and 2 forced outages through the year. The station had an operational dose of 175.5 person·mSv and outage dose of 1 207.1 person·mSv. The collective dose for the single-unit site was 1 382.6 person·mSv.

### ***Gentilly-2***

DECOMMISSIONING REACTORS				
Nuclear power plant	Last day of operation	Internal dose [person·mSv]	External dose [person·mSv]	Annual collective unit dose [person·mSv]
Gentilly-2	28 December 2012	0.5	5.4	5.9

Gentilly-2 is a single unit CANDU station. In 2022, Gentilly-2 was in the storage phase of decommissioning. The reactor was shut down on 28 December 2012.

There was a decrease in the collective doses in 2022 at Gentilly-2 because most radiological work activities with the transition from an operational unit to a safe storage state occurred in 2014. The 2022 station collective dose is only attributed to safe storage transition activities.

The internal dose for the site was 0.5 person·mSv with an external dose of 5.4 person·mSv for the year. The annual collective unit dose for the site was 5.9 person·mSv.

### ***Regulatory update highlights***

The implementation of radiation protection programmes at Canadian nuclear power plants met all applicable regulatory requirements; doses to workers and members of the public were maintained below regulatory dose limits.

### ***Safety-related issues***

No safety-related issues were identified in 2022.

### ***Decommissioning issues***

Gentilly-2 continued in safe storage in 2022.

Pickering unit 2 continued in the safe storage/defuelled state in 2022.

Pickering unit 3 continued in the safe storage/defuelled state in 2022.

### ***New plants under construction/plants shut down***

No units under construction in 2022.

Bruce unit 6 was in refurbishment in 2022.

Darlington units 1 and 3 were in refurbishment in 2022.

### ***Conclusions***

The 2022 average collective dose per operating unit for the Canadian fleet was 959.2 person·mSv/unit. Various initiatives were implemented at Canadian units to keep doses ALARA. Bruce unit 6 and Darlington units 1 and 3 were in refurbishment in 2022. Gentilly-2 and Pickering units 2 and 3 continued through the storage phase of decommissioning shutdown process through the year.

## China

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	47	300.1
VVER	4	285.5
PHWR	2	863.0
All types	53	309.5

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### *Summary of national dosimetric trends*

- Two new PWR units (Fangchenggang 3 and Hongyanhe 6) began commercial operation in 2022. For the 53 reactors, refuelling outages were performed for 31 of 47 PWR units, 1 of 2 PHWR units, and 2 of 4 VVER units in 2022.
- The total collective dose for the Chinese nuclear fleet (47 PWR units, 4 VVER units and 2 PHWR units) in 2022 was 16 406 person·mSv. The resulting average collective dose was 309.5 person·mSv/unit. There was one individual who received a dose higher than 15 mSv in 2022: a whole body effective dose of about 27.8 mSv had been received.
- In the operation of nuclear power plants, annual collective dose is mainly from outages. The ALARA programme is well implemented during the design and operation of all nuclear power plants. The average annual collective dose per unit of 309.5 person·mSv/unit is lower than in the year 2021 (310.9 person·mSv/unit).
- In 2022, there were no radiological events threatening the safety of people and the environment at the operational nuclear power plants. The monitoring index over the year showed that the integrity of three safety barriers was in sound status.

#### *Regulatory requirements*

- On 12 January, the 2021 annual nuclear and radiation safety supervision summary meeting was held. Ye Min, then Vice Minister of Ecology and Environment and Director of the National Nuclear Safety Administration, attended the meeting and delivered a speech.

- On 11 February, Sun Jinlong, Secretary of the Party Group of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, Chief Engineer of Nuclear Safety of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, and Tian Weiyong, Deputy Director of the National Nuclear Safety Administration, visited the East China Nuclear and Radiation Safety Supervision Station to investigate nuclear and radiation safety supervision work.
- On 8 June, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment and other five ministries jointly issued the 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan on Nuclear Safety and Radiation Pollution Prevention.

## Czechia

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
VVER	6	138

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

The main contributors to the collective dose were six planned outages.

Nuclear power plant, unit	Outage information	Committed effective dose (CED) [person·mSv]
Temelin, unit 1	55 days, standard maintenance outage with refuelling	85
Temelin, unit 2	54 days, standard maintenance outage with refuelling	68
Dukovany, unit 1	45 days, standard maintenance outage with refuelling	122
Dukovany, unit 2	38 days, standard maintenance outage with refuelling	60
Dukovany, unit 3	46 days, standard maintenance outage with refuelling	178
Dukovany, unit 4	54 days, standard maintenance outage with refuelling	143

Dukovany nuclear power plant. The outage of unit 2 was performed at the turn of the years 2021 and 2022. The other units were shut down during 2022.

Temelin nuclear power plant. All the units were shut down during 2022.

The annual collective dose in the last years was influenced by planned activities at both Temelin and Dukovany Nuclear Power Plants. The main activities were the ongoing non-destructive heterogenous weld testing and the replacement of feedwater inlet inside the steam generators. The replacement had a common cause in heterogenous welds and had thus to be done successively on all steam generators. A schedule for the following years was created based on the workforce capacity. The selected amount of steam generators was repaired in 2022. A long-term step-by-step replacement was chosen with respect to individual dose limits and ALARA principles.

ALARA principles were applied during the replacement of feedwater inlet.

The other activity at Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant was the mechanical cleaning and inspection of heat transfer tubes and bottom of one of the steam generators. This activity took place at the turn of 2021 and 2022. In addition, the reactor vessel sleeve at unit 4 was inspected.

The other activity at Temelin Nuclear Power Plant was the improvement of chemical diagnostics sleeves of the steam generators.

Outage and total effective doses were at low values. These are the results of a good primary chemistry water regime, a well-organised radiation protection structure and the strict implementation of ALARA principles during activities related to the work with high radiation risk. All committed effective dose (CED) values are based on electronic personal dosimeter readings.

### ***Regulatory requirements***

Radiation protection status for the year 2022 was evaluated in accordance with the new Czech legislation in force since 2016.

## Finland


### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
VVER	2	313.3
BWR	2	392.6
All types	4	353.0

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### Summary of national dosimetric trends

The annual collective dose strongly depends on the duration and type of annual outages. The 2022 collective dose (1 412 person·mSv) was amongst the lowest in the operating history of Finnish nuclear fleet (Olkiluoto units 1 and 2, Loviisa units 1 and 2) despite the relatively long outages. As a result, the 4-year-rolling average of collective doses reached a record low result.



#### Olkiluoto

The duration of the maintenance outage at Olkiluoto unit 1 (OL1) was ca. 32 days. In terms of radiation protection, the most interesting work was the renewal of two main pumps in the shutdown reactor cooling system and related pipelines and valves. The total collective dose of the outage in OL1 was 553 person·mSv.

The duration of the refuelling outage at Olkiluoto unit 2 (OL2) was ca. 9 days. No special works were implemented that would have caused extraordinary doses. The total collective dose of the outage in OL2 was 114 person·mSv.

Right after the maintenance outage at OL1, a fuel leakage was detected in June. A decision was made that leaking fuel bundle needed to be replaced. The duration of the additional outage was about 7 days, and the collective dose was about 20 person·mSv.

The Olkiluoto unit 3 (OL3) reactor went critical for the first time on 21 December 2021.

After that date, the commissioning continued with a core physics test, at reactor power of up to 5%. On 8 January 2022, the reactor power was for the first time increased to 25%, and on 12 April 2022 – to 60%. On 29 April 2022, the reactor was shut down according to the test schedule. During the shutdown, the emergency boration pumps started spuriously. Later, the plant mode was changed to cold shutdown due the generator cooling system problems, and prolonged due to some parts detached from the moisture separator/re-heater. On 8 August 2022, the commissioning continued at 30% power level. On 13 August 2022, the unit plant mode was changed to hot shutdown due the turbine island automation upgrades. The commissioning continued on 28 August 2022, at 60% power level. The power was increased to 80% on 10 September 2022, and to 100 % – on 30 September 2022. On 12 October 2022, the plant was shut down for feed water pump shaft seal repairs, and in further inspections cracks were found from the impellers. The unit returned to operation on 27 December 2022. The collective dose from the 1<sup>st</sup> criticality date to the end of 2022 was 5 person·mSv (electronic dosimeter).

### ***Loviisa***

At unit 1 (LO1), a short maintenance outage was performed, with a collective dose accumulation of 174 person·mSv. The planned duration of the outage was ca. 19 days, but it was delayed by almost 10 days. The outage scope included modification work for primary coolant pump sealing water line seals – in order to reduce the <sup>110m</sup>Ag source term. The sealing material was changed to a silver-free material. During the primary circuit leak tightness test before the start-up of unit 1, one of the new seals failed. The event resulted in several cubic meters of primary coolant water and steam to flood in the primary coolant pump and steam generator rooms. The main cause for the event is still under investigation. As an immediate corrective action, the original seals were installed back, and the silver-free ones removed. The event caused significant amount of inspections, rework and cleaning/decontamination of components and areas. The dose outcome, however, remained relatively low – ca. 10 person·mSv.

At unit 2 (LO2), the outage was a normal inspection outage (the so called four-year outage). The duration of the outage was ca. 36 days, extended from the planned scope of 28 days. The delay was caused by several reasons, the longest being the replacement of one primary coolant pump after vibration issues that had been noticed at the start-up of the unit. The collective dose of the outage was 399 person·mSv. The dose outcome was mainly caused by primary side inspections, internal inspections of steam generators, maintenance works and related auxiliary tasks (insulation, scaffolding, radiation protection work and cleaning).

Despite the challenges, delays and a relatively significant increase of the planned outage scope at both units, the LO1 dose was the lowest of the short annual outages, and the LO2 dose was the lowest of the four-year annual outages.

#### Source term management:

- Primary coolant purification system was modified in 2019 on both units to enable coolant purification during outages. The new system was operated successfully during outages since its installation.
- At unit 2,  $^{110m}\text{Ag}$  on the primary system had been increasing during the previous years. The cause of the phenomenon is still unknown, and investigations are underway. Based on the analysis, the main source for inactive silver is the pressuriser.

### 3) Report from authority

An overall renewal of nuclear safety legislation was initiated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. The STUK regulations and guides will be renewed as well. The objective is to renew and clarify the legislation which has been modified several times over the decades. At the same time, this is an opportunity to clarify the structure according to the principles laid down in the Finnish Constitution. Another objective in the overall renewal of STUK's regulations and guides is to support the development of oversight to be more risk-informed and emphasising the responsibility of the operators according to STUK's strategic goals. Also, new technologies including SMRs (Small Modular Reactors) will be considered in the renewal work.

Fortum submitted applications to the renewal of operating licence for its units in Loviisa until the end of 2050. At STUK, main part of the review work took place in 2022.

TVO has licence to operate Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 until the end of 2038. For Olkiluoto unit 3, STUK granted a fuel loading permit at the end of March 2021. The first criticality took place in December 2021. According to the plant supplier schedule, a regular electricity production will commence after the test period in early 2023.

A new NPP unit, Fennovoima Hanhikivi unit 1 (VVER-type design in Pyhäjoki) was under the construction licence application review in 2022. However, in April 2022, the power company Fennovoima terminated the CLA process.

Posiva, the joint company of Fortum and TVO, is constructing a spent nuclear fuel encapsulation plant and a disposal facility at the Olkiluoto site. Posiva applied for operating licence for both in December 2021.

The only research reactor in Finland was in the decommissioning phase. The spent fuel was removed from the site.

## France

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	58	670
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	1	74
GCR	6	49
LWGR	1	4
FNR	1	18

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### *Summary of national dosimetric trends*

For 2022, the average collective dose of the French nuclear fleet (58 PWRs) was 670 person·mSv/unit (as compared to the 2022 annual EDF objective of 800 person·mSv/unit). This objective was updated (720 person·mSv/unit) at mid-year due to the stress corrosion phenomenon impact on outages. This collective dose is the average for the 58 PWR units in France (two units of Fessenheim, definitely shut down in 2020, are considered “in operation” until September 2023).

The average collective dose for the three-loop reactors (900 MWe – 34 reactors) was 740 person·mSv/unit, and the average collective dose for the four-loop reactors (1 300 MWe and 1 450 MWe – 24 reactors) was 570 person·mSv/unit.

In 2022, the number of working hours in the RCA was 7 193 860 (+ 1% / 2021). The dose index was 5.37 µSv/h (- 7% / 2021).

### Type and number of outages

Type	Number
ASR – Short outage	13
VP – Standard outage	20
VD – Ten-year outage	6
No shutdown	19

### Specific activities

Type	Number
SGR	1
RVHR	0

ASR = Arrêt simple pour rechargement (outage for refuelling); VP = Visite partielle (standard outage); VD = Visite décennale (ten-year outage); SGR = Steam generator replacement; RVHR = Reactor vessel head replacement.

The outage collective dose represented 85% of the total collective dose. The collective dose received when the reactor was in operation represented 15% of the total collective dose. The collective dose due to neutron was 185 person·mSv, 65% of which (120 person·mSv) was due to spent fuel transport.

### **Individual doses**

In 2022, no worker received an individual dose higher than 16 mSv in 12 rolling months on the EDF fleet. Eighty-one per cent of the exposed workers received a cumulative dose lower than 1 mSv, and 99.8 % of the exposed workers received less than 10 mSv.

The main 2022 events with a dosimetric impact were the following:

- The main event of the year 2022, which occurred at the end of 2021 with a major impact on the French nuclear fleet, concerns the stress corrosion phenomenon detected on portions of pipes located in the safety injection system, an appendix to the primary circuit, which led to inspections of the molded elbows on 4-loop reactors (CIV, CHO and PEN1). The investigations continued in 2022.
- The 2022 campaign was ultimately composed of 39 unit outages including 1 steam generator replacement (SGR) (Flamanville 1). Three outages were postponed to 2023 (short outage of Chinon B3 and Cattenom 3, ten-year outage of Saint-Laurent B2), and one outage (standard outage of Chooz 2) added. The actual collective dose for 2022 was 38 600 person·mSv, or 670 person·mSv/unit. The updated dose objective was met.

### *3-loop reactors – 900 MWe*

The 3-loop reactors outage programme was composed of 10 short outages, 10 standard outages and 4 ten-year outages.

- No outage for Blayais 4, Chinon B3 and Saint-Laurent B2;
- outages started in 2021 and finished in 2022: Bugey 5, Dampierre 1 and Gravelines 1 (4<sup>th</sup> ten-year outage), Gravelines 6 (short outage and steam generator replacement);
- outages started in 2022: Blayais 1 and Gravelines 4 (4<sup>th</sup> ten-year outage).

The lowest collective doses for the various outage types were:

- short outage: 191 person·mSv at Blayais 2;
- standard outage: 364 person·mSv at Chinon B4;
- ten-year outage: 1 685 person·mSv at Dampierre 2.

### *4-loop reactors – 1 300 MWe and 1 450 MWe*

The 4-loop reactors outage programme was composed of 3 short outages, 10 standard outages and 2 ten-year outages.

- No outage for Cattenom 3, Golfech 2, Nogent 2, Paluel 1 and 3, Saint-Alban 1;
- outages started in 2021 and finished in 2022: Cattenom 2 (short outage);
- outages started in 2021: Penly 1 (3<sup>rd</sup> ten-year outage) and Civaux 1 (2<sup>nd</sup> ten-year outage);
- outages started in 2022: Golfech 1 (3<sup>rd</sup> ten-year outage), Civaux 2 (2<sup>nd</sup> ten-year outage), Cattenom 1, Penly 2, Chooz 1 and Chooz 2 (standard outages), Flamanville 1 (short outage and steam generator replacement).

The lowest collective doses for the various outage types for the 1 300 MWe were:

- short outage: 253 person·mSv at Belleville 1;
- standard outage: 387 person·mSv at Belleville 2;
- ten-year outage: no ten-year outage finished in 2022.

The lowest collective doses for the various outage types for the 1 450 MWe were:

- short outage: no short outage in 2022;
- standard outage: no standard outage finished in 2022;
- ten-year outage: no ten-year outage finished in 2022.

### ***Main radiation protection significant events (ESR)***

In 2022, six events were classified level 1 at the INES scale (five in 2021). They all concerned skin doses.

- Gravelines Nuclear Power Plant

Three events on unit 2 in January and July (2) (two workers in an event): the skin doses were estimated to be higher than one quarter of the annual limit.

- Chinon B Nuclear Power Plant

One event on unit 1 in July: the skin dose was estimated to be higher than one quarter of the annual limit.

- Paluel Nuclear Power Plant

One event on unit 2 in August: the skin dose was estimated to be higher than one quarter of the annual limit.

- Cruas Nuclear Power Plant

One event on unit 3 in September: the skin dose was estimated to be higher than one quarter of the annual limit.

The analysis of the ESRs highlights the following preponderant causes:

- insufficient consideration of the risk of contamination in the preparation of activities;
- absence and non-mastery of radiological controls during the activities;
- non-compliance with the countermeasures provided for in the radiological work permit.

### **2023 goals**

The collective dose objective for 2023 for the French nuclear fleet is set at 740 person·mSv/unit.

For the individual dose, the objectives are the same as in 2022, due to the outage programme. The objective of no worker with an individual dose > 18 mSv over 12 rolling months is maintained. The following indicators are used:

- number of workers > 10 mSv over 12 rolling months  $\leq$  200;
- number of workers > 14 mSv over 12 rolling months = 0.

In order to maintain the momentum on individual dosimetry of the most exposed workers, a monthly follow-up of companies with at least 5 workers > 10mSv over 12 rolling months is carried out.

A weekly watch is carried out on dose overruns in relation to the categories of workers (Non-exposed workers  $\leq$  1mSv; B workers  $\leq$  6mSv).

### ***Future activities in 2023***

Collective dose – continuation of the activities initiated in 2012:

- source-term management (oxygenation and purification during shutdown, management and removal of hotspots, tests with the gamma camera);
- chemical decontamination of the most polluted circuits (two units);
- optimisation of biological shielding (using CADOR software) (seven units);
- use of the radiation monitoring system.

Other main activities for 2023:

- continuation of new whole-body monitors at the exit of the RB (EVEREST NPP's): 2020-2024;
- continuation of the study of a new neutron detector;
- installation of high-performance beta probes (presented at the ISOE symposium in June 2022);
- continuation of the radiation protection management recovery plan (2021-2023).

The 2023 outage programme consists of 39 outages, with 15 short outages, 16 standard outages and 7 ten-year outages. Seven outages that began in 2021 or 2022 are planned to end in 2023 and include the short outage with steam generator replacement at Flamanville 1, and the standard outages at Blayais 1, Golfech 1, Penly 1, and Civaux 1 and 2.

Blayais 2, Bugey 3, Chinon B1, Dampierre 3, Gravelines 2 and Saint-Laurent B2 (3-loop 900 MW) will carry out their 4<sup>th</sup> ten-year outage, and the phenomenon of stress corrosion detected on portions of pipes located in the safety injection system will be further taken care of, which will disrupt the 2023 outage campaign on all types of nuclear power plants.

### **3) Report from authority**

#### ***ASN assessments***

ASN carries out its oversight role by using the regulatory framework and individual resolutions, inspections, and if necessary, enforcement measures and penalties, in a way that is complementary and tailored to each situation, to ensure optimal control of the risks nuclear activities represent for people and the environment. ASN reports on its duties and produces an assessment of the actions of each licensee, in each field of activity.

## ***ASN assessments per licensee – EDF***

### *Nuclear power plants in operation*

In 2022, ASN observed continued improvement in how worker radiation protection issues were addressed at several nuclear power plants, after a clear deterioration seen in 2019 and 2020. EDF must continue with the steps taken to improve the way in which radiation protection is handled. There are continuing anomalies, notably with the management of industrial radiography work.

With regard to radiation protection, Civaux and Paluel Nuclear Power Plants stood out positively. On the other hand, ASN considers that Dampierre-en-Burly and Gravelines Nuclear Power Plants had underperformed.

### *Nuclear power plants being decommissioned and waste management facilities*


The shutdown reactors operated by EDF (Brennilis, Chooz A, Fessenheim, Superphénix, gas-cooled reactors – GCRs) no longer contain spent fuel. The main safety issues therefore concern the containment of radioactive substances and radiation protection. Some facilities also present an additional risk due to the presence of asbestos, sometimes combined with the presence of radiological contamination, making intervention conditions more complex.

Generally speaking, ASN considers that EDF's facilities undergoing dismantling or being prepared for dismantling are well maintained, and that the operator is demonstrating good follow-up of its commitments. With regard to radiation protection, the organisation set up by EDF under the Radiation Protection Expert (RPE) resulting from the European Council Directive is satisfactory.

## Germany

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person-mSv/unit]
PWR	3	46
BWR	0	-
All types	3	46
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUTDOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person-mSv/unit]
PWR	11	97
BWR	6	88
All types	17	94




#### Summary of national dosimetric trends

After the accident in Fukushima, Germany decided to terminate the use of nuclear power for the commercial generation of electricity. This was enforced by an amendment of the Atomic Energy Act on 6 August 2011, where further operation of eight nuclear power plants (Biblis A, Biblis B, Brunsbüttel, Isar 1, Krümmel, Neckarwestheim 1, Philippsburg 1 and Unterweser) was terminated. With this amendment,

the remaining nine nuclear power plants in operation were/will be permanently shut down step by step by 15 April 2023. In this course, the nuclear power plant Grafenrheinfeld was finally shut down on 27 June 2015, Gundremmingen B on 31 December 2017, Philippsburg 2 on 31 December 2019 as well as Grohnde, Gundremmingen C and Brokdorf on 31 December 2021. Decommissioning of five of the switched off nuclear power plants has started in 2017 (Biblis A, Biblis B, Isar 1, Neckarwestheim 1 and Philippsburg 1), of two in 2018 (Unterweser and Grafenrheinfeld), of two in 2019 (Gundremmingen B and Brunsbüttel) and of one in 2020 (Philippsburg 2). The remaining nuclear power plant Krümmel, which was switched off, is in the post-operational phase; to Krümmel a decommissioning licence was not issued until the end of the year 2022.

The trend in the average annual collective dose for all units in operation from 1990 to 2022 is presented in the figure above. The decrease observed in the years 2011 and 2012 is based on the shutdown of the abovementioned eight nuclear power plants. These plants belong to older construction lines which generally showed a higher annual collective dose compared to later construction lines. In 2022, the average annual collective dose per unit in operation (3 PWR) was 46 person·mSv. In 2022, in Isar 2 a shorter maintenance outage without refuelling was performed, in contrast to Emsland and Grohnde where refuelling outages were carried out. This results in the further reduction of the average annual collective dose per unit in operation in comparison to the previous years. A similar trend is obtained for the total annual collective dose, which is presented in the figure below.

For the plants in decommissioning, the value of the average annual collective dose is higher at 94 person·mSv. In this the three plants in the post-operational phase Krümmel, Grohnde and Brokdorf and the fourteen nuclear power plants Gundremmingen B, Gundremmingen C, Brunsbüttel, Unterweser, Grafenrheinfeld, Biblis A, Biblis B, Isar 1, Neckarwestheim 1, Philippsburg 1, Philippsburg 2, Mülheim-Kärlich, Obrigheim and Stade were taken into account.



## Hungary

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
VVER	4	255 (with electronic dosimeters), 302 (with TLDs)

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022


#### Summary of national dosimetric trends

Using the results of operational dosimetry, the collective radiation exposure was 1 023 person·mSv for 2022 at Paks Nuclear Power Plant (709 person·mSv with dosimetry work permit and 314 person·mSv without dosimetry work permit). The highest individual radiation exposure was 8.6 mSv, which was well below the dose limit of 20 mSv/year, and the dose constraint of 12 mSv/year.

The collective dose was lower in comparison to the year 2021.

The electronic dosimetry data corresponded acceptable with thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD) data in 2022.

**Development of the annual collective dose values at Paks Nuclear Power Plant  
(upon the results of the TLD monitoring by the authorities)**



From 2000, this data has been quoted as individual dose equivalent /Hp(10)/.

### ***Events influencing dosimetric trends***

There was one general overhaul (long maintenance outage) in 2022. The collective dose of the outage was 424 person·mSv at unit 1.

### ***Duration and collective dose of outages***

The durations of outages were 61 days on unit 1; 24 days on unit 3; and 32 days on unit 4. Unit 2 was not shut down for outage. The collective doses of outages were 424 person·mSv on unit 1; 127 person·mSv on unit 3; and 110 person·mSv on unit 4.

## Italy

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	1	20.78 (1 unit – Trino Nuclear Power Plant)
BWR	2	21.98 (1 unit – Caorso Nuclear Power Plant [1.48] + 1 unit – Garigliano Nuclear Power Plant [42.47])
GCR	1	1.35 (1 unit – Latina Nuclear Power Plant)

## Japan

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	10	300
REACTORS OUT OF OPERATION		
PWR	6	129
BWR	17	54
All types	23	73
REACTORS IN DECOMMISSIONING		
PWR	8	203
BWR	15	1 653
GCR	1	0
LWCHWR	1	70

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### *Outline of national dosimetric trend*

The average annual collective dose for operating reactors increased from 213 person·mSv/unit in the previous year (2021) to 300 person·mSv/unit in 2022. The average annual collective dose for reactors out of operation increased from 56 person·mSv/unit in the previous year (2021) to 73 person·mSv/unit in 2022. The average annual collective dose for reactors in decommissioning (excluding Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant) was 109 person·mSv/unit, and that of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant – 4 070 person·mSv/unit.

#### *Operating status of nuclear power plants*

In FY 2022, at most ten PWRs operated.

- From 1 April to 29 April 2022: 5 units (Takahama 4, Ohi 3, Ikata 3, Genkai 4, Sendai 1);
- From 30 April to 7 June 2022: 4 units (Takahama 4, Ohi 3, Ikata 3, Sendai 1);
- From 8 June to 10 July 2022: 3 units (Ohi 3, Ikata 3, Sendai 1);
- From 11 July to 8 August 2022: 4 units (Ohi 3, Ikata 3, Sendai 1 and 2);

- From 9 August to 12 August 2022: 5 units (Ohi 3, Ikata 3, Genkai 4, Sendai 1 and 2);
- From 13 August to 19 August 2022: 6 units (Ohi 3 and 4, Ikata 3, Genkai 4, Sendai 1 and 2);
- From 20 August to 22 August 2022: 7 units (Takahama 3, Ohi 3 and 4, Ikata 3, Genkai 4, Sendai 1 and 2);
- From 23 August to 26 September 2022: 7 units (Takahama 3, Ohi 4, Ikata 3, Genkai 4, Sendai 1 and 2);
- From 27 September to 1 December 2022: 7 units (Mihama 3, Takahama 3, Ohi 4, Ikata 3, Genkai 4, Sendai 1 and 2);
- From 2 December 2022 to 9 January 2023: 8 units (Mihama 3, Takahama 3 and 4, Ohi 4, Ikata 3, Genkai 4, Sendai 1 and 2);
- From 10 January to 12 January 2023: 9 units (Mihama 3, Takahama 3 and 4, Ohi 4, Ikata 3, Genkai 3 and 4, Sendai 1 and 2);
- From 13 January to 30 January 2023: 10 units (Mihama 3, Takahama 3 and 4, Ohi 3 and 4, Ikata 3, Genkai 3 and 4, Sendai 1 and 2);
- From 31 January to 15 February 2023: 9 units (Mihama 3, Takahama 3, Ohi 3 and 4, Ikata 3, Genkai 3 and 4, Sendai 1 and 2);
- From 16 February to 22 February 2023: 8 units (Mihama 3, Takahama 3, Ohi 3 and 4, Ikata 3, Genkai 3 and 4, Sendai 2);
- From 23 February to 25 March 2023: 7 units (Mihama 3, Takahama 3, Ohi 3 and 4, Genkai 3 and 4, Sendai 2);
- On 26 March 2023: 8 units (Mihama 3, Takahama 3 and 4, Ohi 3 and 4, Genkai 3 and 4, Sendai 2).

#### ***Exposure dose distribution of workers at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant***

Exposure dose distributions at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant for dose during FY 2022 are shown below.

Cumulative dose Classification (mSv)	Fiscal year 2022 (April 2022 – March 2023)		
	TEPCO	Contractor	Total
>50	0	0	0
20~50	0	0	0
10~20	6	708	714
5~10	50	966	1016
1~5	225	2261	2486
≤1	1131	5967	7098
Total	1.13	23.29	24.42
Max.(mSv)	11.84	17.60	17.60
Ave.(mSv)	0.80	2.40	2.20

\* TEPCO uses the integrated value from the APD that is equipped every time when an individual enters the radiation controlled area of the facility.

These data are sometimes replaced by monthly dose data measured by an integral dosimeter for the individual.

\* There has been no significant internal radiation exposure reported since October 2011.

### **Regulatory requirements**

The examination of the new safety standards began in July 2013 but no plant obtained approval in FY 2022.

### **3) Report from authority**

- ICRP, the 7<sup>th</sup> International Symposium on the System of Radiological Protection was held on 6-9 November 2023 in Tokyo, Japan.

## Korea

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	21	264
PHWR	3	339
All types	24	273
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	1	22
PHWR	1	34

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### *Outline of national dosimetric trend*


In 2022, the total number of operating nuclear power reactors was 24, including 21 PWRs and 3 PHWRs. In terms of nuclear power plant operation, the total number of 16 217 workers had access to the radiation controlled area and received a total amount of 6 622.61 person·mSv. The total number of workers decreased by 579 in 2022, and the total amount of collective dose increased by 2 284.10 (approximately 2.03%) compared to 8 906.71 person·mSv in 2021. Overall, the number of radiation works and the number of workers' input were similar compared to the previous year.

The average collective dose per unit in 2022 was 273 person·mSv based on the operation of 24 nuclear power reactors. The average individual dose in 2022 was 0.41 mSv. There was no individual whose dose exceeded 50 mSv. The maximum individual dose in 2022 was 15.72 mSv. The fractions of the number of individuals whose doses were less than 1 mSv to the total number of individuals were 88.64%. The radiation dose caused mainly by external exposure was 96.99%, and internal exposure contributed to only 3.10% of the total amount of exposure. In PHWRs, the contribution of internal exposure was relatively higher (approximately 18.93%) than that in PWRs (almost zero %) due to tritium exposure.

**Occupational dose distributions in nuclear power plants in Korea (Year 2022)**

Year	Total number of individuals	Number of individuals in the dose ranges (mSv)								
		< 0.1	[0.1-1)	[1-2)	[2-3)	[3-5)	[5-10)	[10-15)	[15-20)	[20-)
2022	16 217	11 262	3 112	891	397	304	210	39	2	0

**Average collective dose per nuclear power plant unit from 2013 to 2022 in Korea**



## Lithuania

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
LWGR	2	353.35

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### *Events influencing dosimetric trends*

In 2022, the collective dose for the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant staff was 701.33 person·mSv (59% of the planned dose), and for contractors' personnel – 5.36 person·mSv (9% of the planned dose). The external dosimetry system used – thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD).

The highest individual effective dose for the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant staff was 15.76 mSv, and for contractors' personnel – 0.78 mSv. The average effective individual dose for the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant staff was 0.47 mSv, and for contractors' personnel – 0.01 mSv.

The main works that contributed to the collective dose during technical service and decommissioning of units 1 and 2 at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant were dismantling of the equipment, CONSTOR® RBMK-1500/M2 containers treatment, spent fuel handling; cleaning of the bottom of spent fuel storage pools in both units and moving it to the interim spent fuel storage facility; repairing of the hot cell; modernisation and maintenance works at the spent fuel storage pool hall, reactor hall and reactor auxiliary buildings; waste and liquid waste handling; radiological monitoring of workplaces and radiological investigations.

In 2022, no component or system replacements were performed. In 2022, there were no unexpected events.

#### *New/experimental dose-reduction programmes*

Optimisation of radiation protection was done in accordance with the ALARA programme, which mainly focuses on decommissioning activities. For dose-intensive tasks, ALARA analysis was performed, and means for optimisation were identified and implemented.

#### *Organisational evolutions*

The scope of dismantling works increases every year. In 2022, about 40% of the equipment was dismantled (66.4 thousand tonnes of the planned 166.9 thousand tonnes). About 23.9 thousand tonnes

of dismantled equipment were decontaminated up to the free-release level, and about 54.1 thousand tonnes were free-released (the free-release waste from the controlled area, incl. waste from the surveillance area, is 41.6 thousand tonnes). Dismantling of the equipment of the turbine hall of unit 1 was finished in 2019, dismantling of the equipment of the turbine hall of unit 2 was finished in 2021. 81% of the dismantled equipment from units 1 and 2 (taking into account the controlled area waste) were free-released and can be used as secondary raw materials.

In 2022, Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant safely managed all nuclear (fissile) materials. On 30 December 2022, all unused (fresh) nuclear fuel, i.e. fuel assemblies that had not been used during operation of the plant, was removed from the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant units to the new interim spent fuel storage facility.

In 2022, the Fuel Debris Recovery Project (an important nuclear safety related activity of the ongoing Programme of Nuclear Decommissioning at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, which commenced on 10 August 2020) was completed. Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant is the first and only RBMK-type reactor power plant in the world to have performed cleaning of the bottom of fuel storage pools in both its units, and to have confirmed that all spent nuclear fuel, incl. nuclear fuel debris/pellets, has been safely removed and stored in fuel storage casks (CONSTOR®RBMK-1500/M2) at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant interim spent fuel storage facility.

The first campaign of placing waste to the Disposal Module of the LANDFILL Facility for Short-Lived Very Low Level Waste (B19-2 project) was started in 2022.

Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant must ensure the storage of radioactive waste according to the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Requirements by taking maximum measures to prevent radioactive contamination. Consequently, the construction of the fuel storage facilities and radioactive waste repositories is an aspect of the strategic importance of the activities performed at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant.

The priority activities of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant are nuclear and radiation safety, transparency and effectiveness of the activity, responsibility of staff, high professional quality of workers, and social responsibility.

### **3) Report from Authority**

In 2022, VATESI carried out radiation protection inspections at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in accordance with an approved inspection plan. Assessments were made regarding how radiation protection requirements were fulfilled in the following areas and activities: clearance of radioactive materials, monitoring of occupational exposure and workplace monitoring, inspection of radiation control systems and other radiation protection measures at radioactive waste treatment facilities. One minor non-compliance regarding the use of means for hand decontamination in the contamination barrier inside the controlled area was identified. Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant took immediate actions to eliminate the violation.



In 2023, VATESI will continue supervision and control of nuclear safety of decommissioning of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, giving more attention to radiation protection during dismantling and radioactive waste treatment activities. To enhance the radiation protection level during decommissioning of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, VATESI will continue to review the radiation protection requirements established in legal documents.

## Mexico

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
BWR	2	863

- Annual site collective dose: 1 727 person mSv.
- Operating reactors: Laguna Verde 1 and Laguna Verde 2.
- Reactor type: BWR/GE.
- Number of reactors: 2.
- Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type: 863 person mSv/unit.

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

The nuclear reactors existing in Mexico are two BWR/GE units at the Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station located in Laguna Verde, State of Veracruz, Mexico.

No planned refuelling outages occurred in 2022.

- The normal operating dose for unit 1 was 858 person mSv. The total collective dose for unit 1 was 858 person mSv.
- The normal operating dose for unit 2 was 868 person mSv. The total collective dose for unit 2 was 868 person mSv.
- The total site dose in 2022 was 1,727.0 person-mSv.

Laguna Verde's historical collective dose both on-line and during refuelling outages is higher than the BWR average. On-line collective dose is high because of failures or shortcomings in equipment reliability. Some examples are steam leaks, reactor water clean-up system pumps failures, and radwaste treatment systems failures. The station is employing new technology to continue to reduce Co-60 levels. The Station ALARA Committee provided a dose goal for the site in 2022 of 1 890 person·mSv. Due to strong ALARA

focus in 2022 by Laguna Verde management and employees, the 2022 site annual dose was 1 727 person·mSv, or about 9% lower.

### ***Events influencing dosimetric trends***

#### *a) Increase of radioactive source term*

This factor was originated by the reactor water chemical instability induced in turn by the application of noble metals and hydrogen since 2006 to prevent the stress corrosion cracking of reactor internals. This factor is still strongly influencing dose rates at the plant and specifically in the drywell during refuelling outages. Indeed, this is the working area where between 70 and 80% of the collective dose of the refuelling is obtained.

Radiological ALARA challenges in the dry well were carried out with technicians and supervisors involved with the firm purpose of optimising the collective dose at Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station, and activities in the steam tunnel were also attended.

Likewise, the strategies implemented from previous refills are maintained as they are:

- installation of shields;
- installation of solid collector filter;
- use of selective Co-60 resin in the demineralisation filters implemented for the control and reduction of the source term.

#### *b) Chemical decontamination*

Chemical decontamination has been performed on the A/B loops of the recirculation system and on the G33 system in the dry well and reactor building.

The main problem associated with the high collective dose at Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Station is the continued increase of the radioactive source term (insoluble cobalt deposited in internal surfaces of piping, valves).

## Netherlands

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	1	288
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
BWR	1	0.83

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### *Borssele Nuclear Power Plant*

- One regular outage in April (21 days) with the collective dose of 253 person·mSv.
- Maximum individual doses: 2.1 mSv (EPZ) and 3.0 mSv (contractors).
- During 2022, four contamination events occurred, with small contaminations on shoes at the site exit monitors. None of the events had any significant consequences for the workers.
- During shutdown before the outage, a small fuel defect was detected (increase of noble gas in the primary system). A sipping procedure was executed, the leaking fuel element was found and will be repaired in 2023.
- In all cases, the dose of ionising radiation received complied with the legal limits.
- In all cases, the dose of ionising radiation received complied with the EPZ internal limits and targets.
- No internal contamination with a dose greater than 0.1 mSv was received.
- There was no daily dose exceedance during 2022.

#### *GKN Nuclear Power Plant*

- a) Maximum individual dose: 0.28 mSv.

b) No contamination events.

GKN had no regulatory issues in 2022. Dodewaard Nuclear Power Plant is in safe enclosure. At the moment, its decommissioning is scheduled for 2045.

### 3) Report from authority

#### *Borssele Nuclear Power Plant*

ANVS issued two modifications to the licence of EPZ (two XRF-analysers and a modification of the site perimeter).

In May 2022, the EC performed a Euratom Article 35 verification visit to Borssele Nuclear Power Plant. The main findings were:

- the Netherlands are fully compliant with the Article 35 Euratom requirements;
- a suggestion was made to renew the environmental monitoring system in the neighbourhood of the NPP site.

In the field of radiation protection, ANVS supervised the following situations at EPZ:

- the monitoring system for surveying the radiation dose rate at the site perimeter was improved in 2018 based on the outcomes of a 10-yearly safety review. However, the implementation was not fully completed as presented to the ANVS;
- a new transport cask for spent fuel (TN17MAX) was tested;
- changes in the use and categorisation of storage rooms for radioactive waste were not acceptable for ANVS;
- the required acceptance test for the new baggage scanner was not performed before the first use of the scanner;
- different shielding provisions within the RCA were not maintained well;
- a new staff member was assigned as the general radiation protection expert. Because this staff member did not meet the formal experience requirements an exemption was requested from the ANVS. This exemption was granted.

## Pakistan

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	6	135.708
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PHWR	1	676.70

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### Events influencing dosimetric trends

Type	Unit	Outages (Nos.)	Duration (Days)
PWR	C1	03	28
	C2	03	36
	C3	02	28.63
	C4	NIL	NIL
	K2	06	94.4
	K3	04	26
PHWR	K1	Permanently shut down for decommissioning on 1 August 2021.	

#### Component or system replacements

C1:

Replacement of a three-stage hydraulic seal of RCP-A.

K2:

- i. replacement of a damaged GCB grounding switch;
- ii. replacement of a damaged 500 kV isolator;
- iii. replacement of thermal shields of the LP-1 and LP-2 turbine

K3:

Replacement of faulty AVR CH-1 and CH-2 converter cards

***Unexpected events/incidents***

K2:

- i. actuation of SIS on invalid signal during RFO-1 of K2;
- ii. plant manual shutdown due to high sodium and cation conductivity in steam generator.

***New reactors on line***

Two new PWR type reactors (K2 and K3) became operational on 21 May 2021 and 18 April 2022, respectively.

***Reactors definitively shutdown***

K1 was permanently shut down for decommissioning on 1 August 2021.

## Romania

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PHWR	2	364

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### *Events influencing dosimetric trends*

*Normal operation of the plant (Cernavoda U1 and U2)*

At the end of 2022:

- there were 169 employees with annual individual doses exceeding 1 mSv; 41 with individual doses exceeding 5 mSv; and none with individual dose over 10 mSv;
- the maximum individual dose for 2022 was 7.961 mSv;
- the contribution of internal dose due to tritium intake was 20%.

#### *Planned outages*

- A 52-day planned outage was done at unit 1 between 7 May and 28 June 2022. Activities with major contribution to the collective dose were as follows:
  - remediation of fuel channels fixed end shifting;
  - fuelling machine bridge components preventive maintenance;
  - feeder-yoke clearance measurements and correction;
  - inspection for tubing and supports damages in the feeder cabinets;
  - steam generator U-pipes (SG #1): eddy-current inspection and welding of the defective ones;
  - inspection of moisture separators of all four steam generators;
  - planned outages systematic inspections;

- feeder thickness, feeder clearance and feeder-yoke measurements, elbow ultrasonic testing examination;
- snubbers inspection;
- piping supports inspection;
- implementation of engineering changes.

The total collective dose at the end of the planned outage was 545.2 person·mSv (425.2 person·mSv external dose and 120 person·mSv internal dose due to tritium intakes).

Finally, this planned outage had a 75% contribution to the collective dose of 2022.

#### *Unplanned outages*

N/A.

#### ***New/experimental dose-reduction programmes***

In order to decrease individual and collective doses during normal operation of the plant, an action plan was issued and implemented for the optimisation of the preventive maintenance programme.

RP assistants training was improved with the focus on behaviours, the stop work criteria (radiological reasons) and the use of OPEX.

Modelling the behaviour of the personnel involved in activities with associated radiological risk (regarding compliance with RP procedures and radiological risk management) through:

- the systematic monitoring of the radioprotection deficiencies trends, even those of low level/without consequences;
- an observation and coaching programme focused on the behaviour of rad workers inside the radiological zone, carried out by the staff of the Radiological Protection Department, both in running and in planned outages (topics: contamination monitoring activities at the exit of the radiological zone, the exit of the reactor building, equipment decontamination activities, heavy water management, refuelling machine maintenance, etc.);
- prompt reaction to human performance deficiencies with potential consequences on RP area;
- internalisation of the lessons to be learned from the operating experience among the station rad workers, during the pre-job brief meetings (with the mandatory participation of the radioprotection technicians), by OPEX programmes dedicated to the personnel from the Production Division and through the weekly materials on RP topics (Topic of the Week – RP Department message);

The administrative barriers were strengthened to prevent the RP deficiencies recurrence (mandatory pre-job brief meeting with the participation of RP technicians for activities with associated medium radiological risk, mandatory questionnaire to verify rad workers knowledge on the radiation work permit (RWP), mandatory RP assistant assigned for all activities with medium or higher radiological risk).

The physical barriers were strengthened to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination by improving the detection capabilities of the whole-body monitors at the exit of the radiological controlled area (additional gamma radiation detectors were installed).

Effective communication and collaboration between the working groups in different stages of evaluation, preparation and execution of work with associated radiological risk.

Implementing source term reduction actions (pH adjustment and control in PHT system) with positive impact on the gamma radiation fields (18% reduction by comparison with the predicted values) and on the collective radiation collective dose.

RP supervisors attend all the high radiological work risk activities pre-job briefings. RP technicians act as RP assistants for high radiological work risk activities (including industrial radiographies).

## Russia

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
VVER	22	430.5
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
VVER	3	82.3

#### *Collective doses*

In 2022, the total effective annual collective dose of employees and contractors at 22 operating VVER-type reactors was 9 470 person·mSv. This value is 14% higher in comparison to 2021 (8 306 person·mSv).

Average annual collective doses for the groups of VVER-440, VVER-1000 and VVER-1200 reactors in operation in 2022 were:

- 884.5 person·mSv/unit for the group of 5 operating VVER-440 reactors (Kola 1-4, Novovoronezh 4);
- 275.8 person·mSv/unit for the group of 13 operating VVER-1000 reactors (Balakovo 1-4, Kalinin 1-4, Novovoronezh 5, Rostov 1-4);
- 365.5 person·mSv/unit for the group of 4 operating VVER-1200 reactor (Leningrad II-1 and II-2, Novovoronezh II-1 and II-2).

These results show that average annual collective dose for the VVER-1000 and VVER-1200 reactors is 2-3 times lower than the average values for the VVER-440.

Average annual collective dose for three reactors at the stage of decommissioning (Novovoronezh 1-3) in 2022 was 246.8 person·mSv.

The total planned outages collective dose of employees and contractors represents 79% of the total collective dose.

### **Individual doses**

In 2022, individual effective doses of employees and contractors did not exceed the control dose level of 18.0 mSv per year at any VVER-440, VVER-1000 or VVER-1200 reactor.

The maximum-recorded individual dose was 14.6 mSv (Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant). The maximum annual effective individual doses at other nuclear plants with VVER-type reactors in 2022 varied from 6.7 mSv (Rostov Nuclear Power Plant) to 12.2 mSv (Kalinin Nuclear Power Plant).

### **Planned outages duration and collective doses (2022)**

Reactor type	Reactor	Duration [days]	Collective dose [person·mSv]
VVER-440	Kola 1	47	326.0
	Kola 2	47	247.2
	Kola 3	47	271.3
	Kola 4	71	227.4
	Novovoronezh 4	126	2 920.6
VVER-1000	Balakovo 1	—*	—*
	Balakovo 2	11	19.1
	Balakovo 3	—*	—*
	Balakovo 4	33	379.0
	Kalinin 1	—*	—*
	Kalinin 2	61	546.0
	Kalinin 3	60	357.0
	Kalinin 4	31	188.0
	Novovoronezh 5	35	762.8
	Rostov 1	—*	—*
	Rostov 2	—*	—*
	Rostov 3	30	204.2
	Rostov 4	39	213.5
VVER-1200	Leningrad II-1	44	348.5
	Leningrad II-2	42	266.5
	Novovoronezh II-1	38	310.4
	Novovoronezh II-2	43	285.7

\* No outage.

## **2) Principal events of the year 2022**

### **Events influencing dosimetric trends**

In 2022, the relatively elevated contribution in the Rosenergoatom collective dose was registered at three units. This is completely due to large scope of radiation works:

- Novovoronezh 4: long-term planned outage with modernisation of equipment (2 920.6 person·mSv);
- Novovoronezh 5: medium planned outage (762.8 person·mSv);
- Kalinin 2: overhaul (546.0 person·mSv);

### ***Optimisation of radiation protection of workers at nuclear power plants***

Rosenergoatom has a programme for optimisation of occupational radiation protection at nuclear power plants (dose reduction plan). The programme sets targets for collective and individual doses for each nuclear power plant to be achieved by 2024.

The main actions under the programme are:

- organisational measures for improving radiation protection (development and upgrade of procedures, exchange of operating experience, review of results and improvement of planning);
- decrease in radiation levels in nuclear power plant premises and equipment (water chemistry improvement, improvement of decontamination methods, preventing spread of contamination);
- reduction of exposure time (improvement of technological operations, improvement of work with scaffolding and insulation, use of specialised tools, means of mechanisation, remote handling devices, industrial television systems).

## Slovak Republic

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
VVER	4 + 1 (EMO3)	113.70
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUTDOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
VVER	2	Not included in ISOE
GCR	1	Not included in ISOE

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

- Bohunice NPP (2 units):  
The total annual effective dose in Bohunice NPP in 2022, calculated from legal electronic dosimeters and E<sub>50</sub>, was 316.817 person.mSv (employees 94.545 person.mSv, outside workers 222.272 man mSv). The maximum individual dose was 4.852 mSv (outside worker). Without internal contamination. Without anomalies in radiation conditions.
- Mochovce NPP (3 units):  
The annual collective effective dose in Mochovce NPP, evaluated from legal film dosimeters, neutron TLD dosimeters and E<sub>50</sub>, for all three units was 251.684 person.mSv (employees 89.578 person.mSv, contractors 162.106 person.mSv). The maximum annual individual effective dose was 2.716 mSv.  
There was no worker's internal contamination. There were not anomalies in radiation conditions.
- Outage information

#### Bohunice NPP:

- Unit 3 – 21.3 days standard maintenance outage. The collective exposure was 116.388 person.mSv from electronic operational dosimetry.
- Unit 4 – 25.3 days standard maintenance outage. The collective exposure was 155.441 person.mSv from electronic operational dosimetry.

#### Mochovce NPP:

- Unit 1 – 21.1 days standard maintenance outage. The collective radiation exposure evaluated from electronic operational dosimetry was 110.112 person.mSv. The maximum individual dose was 1.553 mSv.

- Unit 2 – 21.3 days standard maintenance outage. The collective radiation exposure evaluated from electronic operational dosimetry was 120.398 person.mSv. The maximum individual dose was 2.688 mSv.

New reactor in commissioning:

Mochovce NPP, Unit 3:

- The first fuel assembly was loaded into reactor on September 9, 2022. The physical test started. The first criticality of unit was on October 22, 2022.

New reactor under construction:

Mochovce NPP, Units 4 is under construction.

### **3) Report from Authority**

In 2022 The Slovak Radiation Regulatory Authority made inspections at both two nuclear power plant facilities in operation concerning optimization of radiation protection. The conclusions from the inspections are that the authority calls for more short and long term concrete and proactive goals for the optimization of radiation protection.

On September 9, 2022 the first fuel assembly was loaded into reactor of Mochovce NPP Unit 3. The physical test started. The first criticality of the unit was on October 22, 2022.

The Slovak Radiation Regulatory Authority applied the regulations for radiation protection according to Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM. The major change in this revision includes: (1) to lower the individual effective dose limit from the current value of 50 mSv/year to 20mSv/year in alignment with the individual dose limits as published in Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM; (2) to lower the current lens dose equivalent limit to 20mSv/year in alignment with the lens dose limit as published in Council Directive 2013/59/EURATOM.

## Slovenia

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR (Krško)	1	1 140

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

- The outage collective dose was 1 080 person·mSv, and the outage duration was 38 days. The dose contribution of the mechanical stress improvement process was 560 person·mSv.
- Phase 3 of the safety upgrade programme was completed in 2022, and it included:
  - bunkered building with safety injection pump and borated water tank;
  - auxiliary feed water pump with condensate storage tank and alternative residual heat removal (RHR) pump;
  - spent fuel dry storage building (the SFDS campaign starts in 2023).

### 3) Report from authority

The main activities of the regulatory authorities (Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration, SNSA and Slovenian Radiation Protection Administration, SRPA) were to host two review missions conducted by the IAEA.

In April 2022, Slovenia hosted the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission. The mission reviewed the legislative and administrative infrastructure against the international (IAEA) standards. It not only checked the compliance of Slovenian regulations with the IAEA standards, but also assessed the personnel capacity, budget adequacy, infrastructure and management systems of both regulatory authorities, their mutual co-operation and co-operation with technical support organisations and other bodies and institutions, procedures for safety assessment of various radiation activities, issuing permits, implementation of inspection control and procedures for drafting regulations. The mission checked comprehensively the entire area of ensuring nuclear and radiation safety in Slovenia, from the peaceful use of nuclear energy to the use of radiation sources in all areas (medicine, science, industry), and its scope was therefore characterised as “full scope”. The report of the mission is published on the SNSA and SRPA webpages.

In October 2022, IAEA conducted the follow-up mission in the field of preparedness for nuclear and radiological accidents (EPREV – Emergency Preparedness REView) in Slovenia. The goal of the mission was to verify the improvements made in Slovenia after the original mission in 2017. Based on the mission report from 2017, Slovenia prepared an action plan to improve its preparedness system for nuclear and radiological accidents. The mission confirmed that Slovenia had successfully completed 28 out of the 31 proposed improvements.

## South Africa

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	2	827.6055

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

A planned outage was executed at unit 1 of Koeberg Nuclear Power Station from 10 to 31 December 2022. During the outage, entries were made into the controlled zone, which resulted in a collective effective dose of 119.29 person·mSv.

## Sweden


### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	2	N/A
BWR	4	420
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	1	N/A
BWR	5	N/A

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### *Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant*

The total dose for Forsmark was 1 295.3 person·mSv based on measurements with thermoluminescent dosimeters, and there were 1 060 persons with a registered dose. The maximum individual dose was 9.4 mSv.



### *Forsmark annual collective dose (TLD) from 1980 to 2022*

The regulatory body's safety evaluation of the Forsmark (FKA) radiation protection (RP) work concludes that it's acceptable, but the occurred RP-related events indicate that it needs to be improved. Two RP-related events resulted in the INES evaluation, one was classified as an INES 1 incident. The radiation superintendents' evaluation of FKA radiation protection work is concordant with the regulatory body's evaluation.

The major refurbishment of the decontamination workshop at unit 3 that started during fall 2021, was finished during the spring of 2022 and have greatly improved working environment and reduced dose. New automated decontamination equipment reduces the time spent in high dose rate area for the decontamination personnel. And greatly increases our decontamination capabilities.

A total of 482 measurements to control internal intake intake was performed, one measurement did result in a mortgaged effective dose exceeding 0.25 mSv. Resulting in a mortgaged effective dose of 0.39 mSv.

During 2022, an investigation into a new monetary value for dose (alpha-value) was carried out in collaboration with all members of the Swedish nuclear industry. The purpose of the investigation is to investigate whether the monetary value should be changed and how we can use the alpha-value more as an optimization tool.

#### **Forsmark 1**

The planned outage was a long "maintenance outage", 36 days. Major work was performed with the Control Rod Drive Mechanism service (CRDMs) and under the reactor pressure vessel head, besides the changing of fuel.

The collective dose received was 560.2 person·mSv, 53% more than the initial dose projection of 364.4 person·mSv . Major contribution factors were, higher dose rates and prolonged work in the reactor coolant system, additional work under the reactor pressure vessel head.

Four radiological incidents occurred regarding for example personnel not wearing correct protection equipment, spread of contamination, high personnel contamination.

Both the highest individual and collective dose was received in maintenance work with reactor coolant system.

The dose rates in the reactor systems shows a slight increasing trend, dose rates in turbine systems shows a slightly decreasing trend.

#### **Forsmark 2**

The planned outage was a "maintenance outage", 21 days. No major work was besides the changing of fuel. The collective dose received was 190.3 person·mSv, in accordance with the dose projection.

Two radiological incidents occurred, both regarding misplaced radioactive materials.

The dose rates in the reactor systems remain fairly stable, dose rates in turbine systems shows a slightly decreasing trend.

Both the highest individual and collective dose was received in connection with nondestructive testing of the reactor coolant system.

### **Forsmark 3**

The planned outage was a “maintenance outage”, 26 days. Major maintenance work was performed in the reactor coolant system and main steam pipes, besides the changing of fuel. The collective dose received was 323.3 person·mSv, 35% more than the initial dose projection of 239.6 person·mSv. Major contribution factors were additional maintenance work with the reactor coolant system.


No radiological incidents occurred.

The dose rates in the reactor systems shows a slight increasing trend, dose rates in turbine systems shows a slight increasing trend.

Both the highest individual and collective dose was received in connection with inspection and maintenance of valves in the reactor coolant system.

### **Ringhals NPP**

The total dose for Ringhals was 637 person·mSv based on measurements with TL dosimeters and there were 614 persons with a registered dose. The maximum individual dose was 6.8 mSv.



A total of 328 measurements to control internal intake was performed, no measurement did result in a mortgaged effective dose exceeding 0.25 mSv.

### ***Oskarshamn NPP***

The supervisory authority's radiation safety evaluation of OKG 2022-2023 was continued and overwhelmingly positive and the authority has expressed satisfaction with OKG, for the fifth year in a row.

The Radiation Safety Authority's annual combined assessment of radiation safety was that OKG continued to have a plant in good condition, with stable operation and with a plant change exchange and qualification activities as well as operational activities that work well and the authority notes that OKG has strengthened parts of its operations and the conditions for radiation-safe work, and has an ability to carry out continuous improvements.

Based on this the authority made the overall assessment that the radiation safety at OKG is satisfactory.

The total dose for OKG during 2022 was 1048.3 person-mSv based on measurements with TL dosimeters for 855 individuals, with registered dose, and the maximum individual dose for one individual was 13.0 mSv.

A total of 208 measurements was performed to control internal intake, of which forty-four measurements have been carried out during the outage period, forty-one statistical measurements and three measurements with regard to events, and these measures did not show any internal intake that resulted in an mortgaged effective dose exceeding 0.25 mSv.

Area monitoring and contamination control outside controlled area has been carried out at all facilities in accordance with regulatory requirements and no increase above normal background was detected during the measurements carried out during the year.

Several parts of demolition have been carried out at the O1 and O2 facilities.

Dismantling and demolition of the reactor containment at O1 has involved extensive work, through the scrapping of systems, cleaning of Dry Well and Wet Well and ongoing cleaning throughout the entire work package. Dose-reducing measures were sludge suction from the bottom of the reactor tank, dismantling of probe bottles, extra flushing of pipe systems and shielding with lead mats. Work has also been underway with disassembly and demolition of the turbine plant. In the optimization plan for O1, the focus has been on streamlining the flow of materials, to reduce the storage of disassembly and demolition objects in place and to streamline the work methodology for measuring objects, with the intention of reducing the general level of radiation to personnel. Disassembly and demolition of systems in the reactor part has also been carried out during the year and has continued in 2023. Radiation protection preparations have been carried out, such as decontamination and flushing of cooling and purification systems, disassembly and transport of plate heat exchangers, decontamination and flushing of main drains and transport of stored active components. Some Hot Spots have been removed to have a better working environment. Preparations for the dismantling and demolition of the turbine basement also began during the year.

Final disassembly and demolition of systems in the reactor part at O2 has been carried out during the year and has continued in 2023. Hot Spots has been removed for the possibility of a better working environment and flushing of systems for cooling and purification has been carried out. Dismantling and tearing down the reactor enclosure has involved dose-burdening work. Dose-reducing measures implemented were sludge suction from the bottom of the reactor tank, extra flushing of pipe systems and shielding with lead mats. Preparations for the dismantling and demolition of the reactor tank was completed and dismantling and demolition of the turbine basement began during the year.

At O3 there were two short stoppages during the year, where the first stoppage was due to a fuel damage and the second stoppage was carried out to remedy a water leak from the neutral conductor in the main generator outlet box and with a simultaneous leak search for the replacement of a damaged nuclear fuel cartridge. The outage was extended due to ground faults to the water transfer system from the secondary space to the lower primary space and ended in a twenty-eight-day outage shutdown. The dose rates had increased slightly in the steam systems from the reactor tank (the reactor tank lid) to the intermediate superheaters.

OKG has continued to work on the problems surrounding the moisture content in the steam and the dose rate increase in the systems, and discussions have been carried out linked to the long-term consequences for the facility, in the event of a lowering of the action level in the chemistry manual.

The dose forecast for the outage shutdown 2022, at the O3 reactor, was calculated to 320 person·mSv and the outcome was 388 person·mSv, of which 12 person·mSv was additional. The largest exceedance of 24 person·mSv was to be found under the heading insulation work.

No deviations or exceedances regarding individual dose was noted.

During the year it was a continued extensive work with the FME, with the main purpose to keep down the number of fuel damages at the O3 reactor.

During the year, continued preparation was also carried out to get the new free release facility in operation.

Instructions for categorization, classification and reporting of radiation protection incidents are still used in the company and have been adapted to meet the radiation safety authority's requirements for written reports to the authority, both in terms of operational activities and in terms of decommissioning activities. However, the main instruction is planned to be updated again by combining the instruction for reporting with the main instruction for categorization and classification of radiation protection-related events.

A cause analysis has been carried out regarding radiation protection events that occurred in 2021 and 2022 within the decommissioning activities at OKG and the analysis report have been valued by department Safety and Quality at OKG and linked to the authority evaluation of OKGs radiation safety assessment.

### ***Barsebäck NPP***

Barsebäck two reactors have been permanently shut down, unit 1 since 1999 and unit 2 since 2005.

Nuclear decommissioning and dismantling has started at Barsebäcksverket (BVT) 2020.

The main projects during 2022 was WP1 (segmentation of RPV:s), WP3 (dismantling of the condensers), WP4.1 (dismantling of the turbine basement) , WP5 (segmentation of the biological shield), WP6.1-2 (dismantling of components inside the biological shield including primary circuit pumps and the opening of transport ways in to the containment) and WP12 (dismantling of the reactor building in level 7-10).

Other projects underway was reconditioning of low- and intermediate level waste.


The annual collective dose received was 184.5 person·mSv (TLD and cumulative dose from internal contamination). 171 individuals have received a registered dose ( $\geq 0.1$  mSv per calendar month).

The three largest dose contributors were project WP1 (122.1 person·mSv), project WP6.1-2 (31.6 person·mSv) and WP5 (27.5 person·mSv).

Highest individual dose 2022 was 8.1 mSv (TLD).

6 persons got a cumulative dose from internal contaminations, giving an equivalent dose between 0.3 and 1.5 mSv. A total of 150 whole body measurements was performed in 2022.

*BKAB Annual collective dose (TLD) 1975-2022.*



### 3) Report from Authority

Continued work to develop new regulations for nuclear power plants has been ongoing and was published in 2021. They were decided on 11 November 2021 and entered into force on 1 March 2022, ongoing implementation of certain sections. The new regulations give some clarification when to report to the authority for example in occurred events which may have radiation protection effects. Also, the regulations on disposal of nuclear waste were decided on 11 November 2021.

The department "Security and Licensing and Supervision" is actively following the planning/ work carrying out of the decommissioning of the four reactors that shut down 2016-2020 but also normal supervision of the operating nuclear reactors has been conducted. During 2022 was inspections conducted at the three operational nuclear power plant concerning "protection of workers" where the new regulations was in use.

## Switzerland

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	3	328.5
BWR	1	1 448.8
All types	4	608.6
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
BWR	1	290.1

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

- Gösgen (KKG) has seen decreasing levels of dose rate and subsequently of dose since the implementation of zinc injection.
- At Leibstadt (KKL), the Mechanical Stress Improvement Programme (MSIP) of some nozzles of the reactor pressure vessel caused 199 person·mSv. MSIP is a process to prevent the occurrence or growth of cracks in nozzle welds. One residual heat removal system (RHR) was decontaminated *in situ* to reduce radiation fields for subsequent maintenance work. In total, 5E+11 Bq were removed from contaminated surfaces by a chemical process. An average decontamination factors of 18 at system components and 5 at working locations were achieved. Thus, approx. 470 person·mSv of exposure were avoided.
- Beznau (KKB) performed regular operating cycles and a refuelling outage in KKB-1, a maintenance outage in KKB-2. Slightly increasing dose rate levels at unit 1 steam generators hot and closure legs were under investigation.
- Mühleberg (KKM) is in the state of decommissioning. Spent fuel and other radioactive waste was shipped to the Swiss interim storage site in large quantities. Some 3 000 tons of material originating from the radiologically controlled area have been released since the definitive shutdown. The single biggest dose contributor was the dismantling of the main condenser (48 person·mSv).

## Ukraine

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
VVER	15	340

In 2022, across the Energoatom nuclear power plants, the indicator of the annual collective dose of personnel exposure was 340 person·mSv per power unit. Compared to 2021, this indicator decreased (in 2021 – 529 person·mSv/unit).

The decrease of this indicator in 2022 occurred due to its decrease at Zaporizhzhе Nuclear Power Plant in connection with the beginning of the full-scale military aggression of the Russian federation against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and the temporary occupation of Zaporizhzhе Nuclear Power Plant. The indicator of the annual collective dose of personnel exposure for nine months of 2022 was 130 person·mSv/unit, as compared to 550 person·mSv/unit in 2021. Starting from the fourth quarter of 2022, information on the personnel radiation doses at Zaporizhzhе Nuclear Power Plant has not been made available to the Company's Directorate.

Indicators of the annual collective dose of personnel exposure per one power unit of Rivne, Khmelnytskyi and South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants in 2022 remained at the level of the previous years 2020 and 2021.

## United Arab Emirates

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	2	166.3 (EDR)

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

Unit 1 of Barakah Nuclear Power Plant experienced a successful first refuelling outage in 2022, without any radiological events. Barakah Nuclear Power Plant consistently demonstrates the highest standards in radiological safety and facilitates work in radiologically controlled areas while maintaining radiation exposure as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). The Radiological Safety team has implemented the use of remote monitoring instruments such as telemetries, RDS and communication headsets for the first time to support the high radiological risk activities such as the reactor assembly and disassembly and the steam generator nozzle dam removal and installation.

However, delays in the unit 1 refueling outage due to failure in the testing of the Pilot Operated Safety Relief Valve (ROSRV) resulted in additional 2 114 person-hours and 7.42 person·mSv. Lessons learnt out of the unit 1 refueling outage and the unit 2 check outage were captured to achieve excellence and drive industry to the best level of performance as part of continuous improvement. Barakah implements radiological safety and ALARA programmes, which meets the industry practices with alignments to the WANO and INPO guidelines.

## United Kingdom

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	1	26.4
GCR	8 <sup>(1)</sup>	19.8
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
GCR	28 <sup>(2)</sup>	9.9 (Magnox = 10.1; AGR = 9.3)

#### Notes

(1) 8 advanced gas-cooled reactors.

(2) 22 Magnox reactors and 6 advanced gas-cooled reactors.

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

Sizewell B did not have any outage in calendar year 2022, therefore doses for the year were low.

Of the advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGRs), Dungeness B, Hinkley Point B and Hunterston B are permanently shut down. The reduced number and scope of AGR outages resulted in very low doses with the annual CRE ranging from ~5 person·mSv to ~60 person·mSv per AGR site. The remaining AGRs are planned to shut down permanently between 2026 and 2028.

Decommissioning continued on the Magnox sites with the majority of the sites focus being on intermediate level waste retrieval and packaging. The annual CRE at decommissioning sites ranged from approximately 1 person·mSv to 50 person·mSv.

Construction of the Hinkley Point C twin EPRs continued with commissioning expected in June 2027. EDF continued to progress plans for another twin EPR site at Sizewell C. The final investment decision is expected in late 2023.

## United States

### 1) Dose information for the year 2022

ANNUAL COLLECTIVE DOSE		
OPERATING REACTORS		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	61	323.56 (19 736.96 / 61 units)
BWR	31	1 003.74 (31 115.90 / 31 units)
All types	92	552.75 (53 852.86 / 92 units)
REACTORS DEFINITELY SHUT DOWN OR IN DECOMMISSIONING		
Reactor type	Number of reactors	Average annual collective dose per unit and reactor type [person·mSv/unit]
PWR	12	214.06 (2 568.75 / 12 units)
BWR	4	535.92 (2 143.68 / 4 units)
FBR (Fermi 1)	1	0.00

### 2) Principal events of the year 2022

#### *Summary of US occupational dose trends*

The US PWR and BWR occupational dose averages for 2021 reflected a continued emphasis on dose-reduction initiatives at the 92 operating commercial reactors. Also, one unit transitioned to the decommissioning phase.

Reactor type	Number of units	Total collective dose	Average dose per reactor
PWR	61	19 736.96 person mSv	323.56 person mSv/unit
BWR	31	31 115.90 person mSv	1 003.74 person mSv/unit

The total collective dose for the 92 reactors in 2022 was 50 852.86 person mSv. The resulting average collective dose per reactor for US LWR was 552.75 person mSv/unit. The 2022 total collective dose was 9.5% lower than the previous year. There were 54 refuelling outages in 2022 compared to 56 refuelling outages in 2021.

### *US PWRs*

The total collective dose for US PWRs in 2022 was 19 736.96 person mSv for 61 operating PWR units. The 2022 average collective dose per reactor was 323.56 person mSv/PWR unit. The 2022 US PWR total collective dose was 1% higher than the previous year. US PWR units are generally on 18- or 24-month refuelling cycles. The Watts Bar unit completed a steam generator replacement outage in 2022 which contributed to the slightly higher US PWR annual dose. The US PWRs with the lowest annual doses in 2022 were Ginna (18.08 person·mSv), Seabrook (24.90 person·mSv) and V.C. Summer (35.10 person·mSv).

### *US BWRs*

The total collective dose for US BWRs in 2022 was 31 115.90 person mSv for 31 operating BWR units. The 2022 average collective dose per reactor was 1 003.74 person·mSv/BWR unit. The 2022 US BWR total collective dose was 9% lower than the previous year. Most US BWR units are on 24-month refuelling cycles. This level of average collective dose is primarily due to power uprate and water chemistry challenges at some US BWR units.

### ***New plants online/plants shutdown***

In 2013, Southern Company started construction of two new Westinghouse 4-loop AP1000 PWRs at the Vogtle site in Georgia. Vogtle unit 3 commenced commercial operations on 31 July 2023. Each unit has a capacity factor of 3 400 MWth (1 117 MWe). The estimated final cost for the two PWR units is \$34 USD billion. The cooling source for the Vogtle site is the Savannah River. Two 600 ft (180 m) tall, natural draft cooling towers have been constructed for units 3 and 4.

The Diablo Canyon units 1 and 2 site in San Luis Obispo County, California, was scheduled to be shut down permanently in 2024 and 2025, respectively. The site provides 10% of California's electricity. However, state government and US DOE are evaluating new opportunities for the units including adding desalination and hydrogen production for California. The US NRC granted an exemption to allow Diablo Canyon to pursue licence extension of up to 20 additional years (or at least until 2030 to allow a smooth transition to renewable energy for the state).

Palisades shut down in May 2022. The decommissioning owner of Palisades (Holtec) is applying to US NRC to restart the unit to meet Michigan and USA carbon-free national electric generation goals.

Three US nuclear sites continue transitioning to safe-store in 2022 including:

- 1.) Duane Arnold (BWR).
- 2.) Indian Point units 2 and 3.
- 3.) Three Mile Island units 1 and 2.

- 4.) Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The Pilgrim decommissioning trust fund (DTF) has been determined to be adequate to cover the cost of site decommissioning by the owner, Holtec and the US NRC has concurred.

Some decommissioning sites are being considered for future micro-reactors or other new carbon-free electric generation. TVA and OPG have launched a partnership to install small modular reactors in their service areas. TVA is planning to site SMR on sites where previous nuclear stations were partially constructed but not operated e.g., Bellefonte Nuclear Station. (The University of Illinois, where NATC is located, is in the process of planning and licensing a new micro-reactor on campus to provide heat and electricity to the University.)

### ***Major evolutions***

Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant units 3 and 4 were authorised a subsequent licence renewal by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on 4 December 2019. This marked the first time a US reactor lifespan was extended from 60 years to 80 years. The two units were previously scheduled to shut down in 2032 and 2033. The NRC issued guidance to the 80-year reactor licensing renewal in July 2017. Turkey Point units 3 and 4 filed for the 80-year reactor lifespan extension in June 2018. Peach Bottom units 2 and 3 were also granted an 80-year operating license by the NRC. In 2022, additional documentation was requested by the US NRC to support the reactor life-extension licensing activities, particularly on the topic of increasing ocean level's impact on site operations.

### ***New/experimental dose-reduction programmes***

Seventy pixelated 3D CZT units are in use at Canadian and US nuclear plants. The CZT technology achieves individual isotopic identification using GPS to verify the adequacy of temporary shielding, contamination control and radioactive waste shipments dose rates. Point Beach units 1 and 2 installed the CZT spectra system to provide four CZT detectors on the PWR CRUD Burst lines (e.g., letdown) for real-time monitoring of an unexpected, failed fuel episode at the start of the current cycle.

### ***Technical plans for major work in 2022***


LaSalle County (US BWR) achieved the first known GE BWR recirculation system flow control valve repair. Also, LaSalle County continued the implementation of high-efficiency ultrasonic CRUD cleaning and metal filter systems to preclude the need to cut out and replace highly contaminated plant piping and valves. LaSalle unit 2 is planning the first known GE BWR replacement of the core vessel bottom drain piping.

US PWRs are replacing up to 800 baffle bolts on their core barrel due to foreign material exclusion (FME) and embrittlement issues. About 200 baffle bolts are being replaced per refuelling outage at PWRs classified as moderately susceptible by the NRC. Some PWRs are having Westinghouse complete an up-flow modification in the reactor vessel to preclude failed fuel episodes. The PWR modifications can extend the typical US PWR from 35 days to 90 days to allow adequate time for reactor vessel modifications in addition to refuelling activities.

**Regulatory plans for major work in 2022: NRC’s Reactor Oversight Programme – Regulatory Framework**

The US NRC’s regulatory framework for reactor oversight is shown in the diagramme below. It is a risk-informed, tiered approach to ensuring plant safety. There are three key strategic performance areas: reactor safety, **radiation safety**, and safeguards. Within each strategic performance area are cornerstones that reflect the essential safety aspects of facility operation. Satisfactory licensee performance in the cornerstones provides reasonable assurance of safe facility operation and that the NRC’s safety mission is being accomplished.

Within this framework, the NRC’s operating reactor oversight process provides a means to collect information about licensee performance, assess the information for its safety significance, and provide for appropriate licensee and NRC response. The NRC evaluates plant performance by analysing two distinct inputs: inspection findings resulting from NRC’s inspection programme and performance indicators (PIs) reported by the licensees.



**Occupational radiation safety cornerstone and 2022 results**

- *Occupational radiation safety* – The objective of this cornerstone is to ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. This exposure could come from poorly controlled or uncontrolled radiation areas or radioactive material that unnecessarily exposes workers. Licensees can maintain occupational worker protection by meeting applicable regulatory limits and ALARA guidelines.
- *Inspection procedures* – There are five attachments to the inspection procedure for the occupational radiation safety cornerstone:

IP	<a href="#">71124</a>	Radiation Safety-Public and Occupational
IP	<a href="#">71124.01</a>	Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
IP	<a href="#">71124.02</a>	Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls *
IP	<a href="#">71124.03</a>	In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
IP	<a href="#">71124.04</a>	Occupational Dose Assessment
IP	<a href="#">71124.05</a>	Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

- *Occupational exposure control effectiveness* – The performance indicator for this cornerstone is the sum of the following:
  - technical specification high radiation area occurrences;
  - very high radiation area occurrences;
  - unintended exposure occurrences.

Occupational Radiation Safety Indicator	Thresholds		
	(White) Increased Regulatory Response Band	(Yellow) Required Regulatory Response Band	(Red) Unacceptable Performance Band
Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness	> 2	> 5	N/A

The latest ROP performance indicator findings can be consulted at

[www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/pi\\_summary.html](http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/pi_summary.html).

Additional background information can be found on the detailed ROP description page at

[www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/rop-description.html](http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/rop-description.html).